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ABSTRACT 
 
 Modern states and legal structures around the world are pressed by the forces of 
globalization to accommodate increasingly diverse multicultural populations. Older and 
more frequently followed models for cultural integration are rooted in theories of 
assimilation or liberal pluralism. These theories can demand unbalanced changes from 
either minority communities or the state. Few theories identify the dual process of 
interdependence necessary for the democratic inclusion of diverse minority communities 
in Europe. This thesis explores the historical intent and shortcomings of immigration and 
integration legislation as it relates to ethnic minority communities in Great Britain and 
the Netherlands, and makes a case for including a balanced interdependence model in the 
political discussion of multiculturalism. I argue that promoting multicultural 
interdependence through immigration and integration legislation could preserve both 
European democratic institutions and the benefits of difference, in much the same way 
that the European Union has preserved the legacy of the state. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCING THE PROBLEM, METHODOLOGY, AND STRUCTURE 
 
I. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND CENTRAL PROBLEM 
The aim of the project at hand is to evaluate legal challenges to successful 
democratic pluralism and multicultural citizenship in Great Britain and the Netherlands—
two European Union countries which have approached the integration of minority 
communities in distinct ways. The dilemmas guiding this research are twofold. Firstly, 
the thesis will assess the effectiveness of immigration and integration legislation in 
supporting multi-ethnic societies and democratic integration in Great Britain and the 
Netherlands. Secondly, the thesis will evaluate the potential of European Union 
legislation as an alternative model for supporting cosmopolitan citizenship in EU member 
states. The central goal of the thesis will be to more clearly analyze the shortcomings of 
current attempts at pluralism in two EU countries, and to provide a new theoretical model 
for accommodating growing multicultural societies in Europe.  
 
II. COMPELLING REASONS FOR STUDY 
Three key motivations have convinced me of the importance of devoting serious 
time and effort to such an area of research. First, the phenomenon of globalization as it 
relates to legal structures and individuals is relatively under-studied in comparison to the 
more popular economic and technological facets of globalization. Growing numbers of 
communities with hybrid cultures and transnational attachments confront inflexibility in 
the legal sphere—a reality which should not go unstudied. Second, the unique political 
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structure of the European Union provides examples of both transnational governance, as 
well as traditional statehood. Using European Union member states as subjects for study 
allows for research which touches on both the field of modern globalization studies and 
more classical political theory. Finally, a changing international political environment 
places increased global responsibility and accountability on states and transnational 
institutions to maintain universal democracy. These new demands encourage fresh 
contributions to academic theory and legal structure. As scholars like Will Kymlicka 
argue, “finding morally defensible and politically viable answers” to the challenges of 
diversity and human rights is perhaps “the greatest challenge facing democracies today.”1 
Grappling with this challenge from the perspective of law—perhaps one of the oldest 
institutions in the history of statehood—is a particularly important endeavor.  
 
III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 Though many questions may emerge from the breadth of the research completed 
in the present thesis, three have motivated my own work. The first two questions are 
broader, while the final deals precisely with the content of the case studies. First, I seek to 
explore why minorities are increasingly finding it difficult to “belong” to their immigrant 
host-countries. Second, the thesis is motivated by a desire to understand how the state, 
citizenship, and individual identity are influenced or changed by globalization. Finally, 
the two case studies attempt to examine how and to what extent traditional models 
guiding immigration and integration legislation make immigrants’ efforts at democratic 
integration more difficult. 
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IV. CENTRAL CONCEPTS 
 I have chosen five concepts as the foundation of my literature review which 
explore the power of globalization and the state in the definition of identity and 
citizenship. These concepts include the state, citizenship, globalization, integration, and 
legal pluralism. Each concept adds to the discussion on citizenship and identity in an era 
of globalization. The sections on the state, citizenship, and globalization explore the 
relationship between the individual and the state, and the challenges of new social 
contracts and diverse communities in an era of globalization. The sections on integration 
and legal pluralism introduce a variety of traditional options for managing migration, and 
begin to illustrate some of the difficulties associated with such models in an era of 
globalization and hybridized identities.  
The five concepts emerge together to paint a portrait of the multiple avenues 
where immigration and integration law combine with state and multicultural community 
relationships.i Each concept begins to articulate a conversation about the state which 
suggests that identity and its relationship to the state has fundamentally changed. No 
longer are states homogenous, nor is citizenship necessarily reflective of a particular 
identity. Furthermore, globalization increases the possibility and probability of a single 
individual embodying and cherishing ‘multiple’ identities, or even seamlessly hybrid 
identities. Modern developments in immigration and integration law make ‘seamless’ 
                                                 
i
 Though the term ‘multiculturalism’ is not included as a separate concept, it remains essential to the 
present discussions. I use the term to signify the diversity of community, ethnicity, race, culture, etc. that is 
increasingly dominating center stage across political agendas in Europe. Whether European communities 
are intentionally multicultural or not, the diversity of their societies requires active engagement with 
community groups that are often seen to be ‘at odds’ with the larger society as a whole. I am largely of the 
opinion that multicultural debate and negotiation (through which cultural hybrids emerge) is positive, 
though only when respectful and democratic forums can be maintained. Additional literature suggests that 
multicultural engagements may not necessarily be either realistic or beneficial for national communities. I 
have chosen not to review this literature as a result of both space constraints and the reality that both case 
studies for the purpose of this thesis actively recognize their multicultural communities in some way.  
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cultural hybridity somewhat more difficult, especially when identities emerge in 
opposition to one another. The larger portion of the thesis explores two case studies 
which have historically negotiated such a problematic of difference through immigration 
and integration law. 
 
V. RESEARCH TECHNIQUES, STRATEGIES, AND A NOTE ON THE CASE STUDIES 
 I have relied on three techniques for research throughout my thesis. The first 
portion of the thesis, which defines central concepts, relies on secondary sources 
published by scholars on each of the main themes. These academic resources place the 
thesis within a specific scholarly context, and lay the conceptual framework on which the 
thesis rests. The analysis of case studies in the second and third portions of the thesis 
relies on primary sources, including legal documents, cases, and interpretations which 
illustrate state responses to minority integration in the studied countries. Secondary 
academic resources and the analysis of authors in the field of anthropology and legal 
studies support the primary sources in the two case study sections. 
 
A Note on the Case Studies 
While a more lengthy work could address a larger array of European examples, 
my own analysis is limited by several practical factors. Time and thesis capacity limits 
are particularly acute in the case of an undergraduate thesis. An additional research 
obstacle is provided by the vast quantity of literature available and my proficiency in 
primarily English sources. These constraints impact the number of case studies analyzed, 
and also the theoretical literature discussed.  
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Working against these factors, I have selected the Netherlands and Great Britain 
as case studies which provide distinct historical negotiations with pluralism and ethnic 
minority populations. The past academic year gave me the opportunity to spend a 
semester in both locations, and I thus have an increased familiarity with the obstacles of 
‘difference’ that are unique to the UK and the Netherlands. Both case study countries 
have a long history of migration and immigration legislation, and have made significant 
changes to this legislation over the past few decades. The UK and the Netherlands have 
also employed a similar range of assimilation and pluralistic policies in an effort to 
integrate minority and immigrant communities.  
Thus, the case studies chosen for this study are not arbitrary, and they speak to a 
larger European phenomenon of legal negotiation with cultural difference. Several edited 
works deal more comprehensively with European immigration, and are a valuable asset 
to both the theoretical and historical dimensions of this thesis. Andrew Geddes has 
contributed a complete study of EU countries with his book The Politics of Migration and 
Immigration in Europe2 and Randall Hansen and Patrick Weil (eds.) have similarly 
approached nationality law in their book Towards a European Nationality: Citizenship, 
Immigration, and Nationality Law in the EU.3 
 
VI. PERSONAL PREPARATION AND BACKGROUND 
 From the beginning of my journey as a student at Macalester College, the 
possibility of completing an honors thesis in my senior year has been an undertaking I 
have steadily looked and worked forward to. From the introductory course on 
globalization, to two independent tutorials on globalization and the European Union in 
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my sophomore year, and finally to two semesters abroad, the seriousness of my courses 
have directed me toward the rewarding efforts of writing a thesis as the capstone of my 
career at Macalester. Two semesters abroad in London, England and Maastricht, 
Netherlands, offered me a valuable opportunity to explore the place of ethnic minorities 
from a European legal perspective. A seminar on Ethnic Minorities in British Law while 
studying in London, and an independent study on a similar subject with a legal studies 
professor in Maastricht further honed my interest in the legal responses to the cultural 
hybrids that result from globalization.  
 
VII. FACULTY MENTOR 
 Following a significant career of mentorship under the guidance of Professor 
Ahmed Samatar in the Department of International Studies, it seems most appropriate 
that he should once again direct my studies in the form of an honors thesis. Professor 
Samatar’s expertise in globalization and global citizenship studies are an invaluable asset 
as I begin the writing process, and his commitment to excellence is both challenging and 
inspirational. His familiarity with my learning and writing styles has also proved 
advantageous throughout the significant task of constructing and editing the thesis. 
 
VIII. CENTRAL CONCLUSIONS AND PROJECT OUTLINE 
Approaching the topic of multiculturalism in a multi-state polity like the 
European Union is a complicated task, but it is necessary in an effort to understand the 
multicultural challenges that the growing Union faces today. More generally, the thesis 
seeks to assess the impact of Dutch and British legislation on the success of attempts at 
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multicultural citizenship and legal pluralism. My research suggests three central 
conclusions. First, new immigrants confront immigration policies that highlight economic 
contributions and fail to reinforce the value of democratic institutions. Minorities feel 
detached from democratic institutions at entry, and are either intent on returning home, or 
resistant to change. In either case, minority groups remain incompletely integrated into 
European cultures. Second, new immigrants (or more ‘adapted’ older migrants) become 
forced hybrids with citizenship rights that are imperfectly explained or incompletely 
protected through permanent legal structures. To put it simply, globalization has 
magnified and increased the number of cultural hybrids, but the state and its institutions 
of citizenship are still navigating this new world. Third, state legislators continue to be 
guided by polarized theoretical models in their efforts to ‘globalize’ their democratic 
processes and institutions. Rather than seeking a more balanced model for immigration 
and integration, European states rely on assimilation or pluralist models which encourage 
cultural ‘enclaves.’  
In order to begin resolving these problems, immigration and integration 
legislation should be revised around an interdependence model which seeks to recognize 
both the benefits and challenges of nurturing migrant communities. I use the European 
Union’s institutions as a model for integration which promotes collaboration between 
highly diverse communities, as a result of common investment in institutions and 
common security. Though the European Union is far from a perfect polity, it does 
provide a unique lens for considering the possibilities of a more diverse ‘union’ within 
states themselves that emerges from the benefits of diversity itself. 
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The first portion of the thesis reviews the available literature on several concepts 
which are essential to the larger illustration of pluralism in the two European cases 
studied. These concepts include the state, citizenship, globalization, integration models, 
and legal pluralism. The second and third portions of the thesis outline and analyze Great 
Britain and the Netherlands as two case studies whose legislation creates unique obstacles 
for multi-ethnic and cosmopolitan societies. Portions two and three explore the legal 
challenges of accommodating what Ulrich Beck calls “transnational place polygamy,”—a 
term which describes the processes of transnational attachment, cultural mixing, 
adaptation and “globalization of biography” that result from globalization.4  
In the Dutch and the British cases, changes in immigration and integration 
legislation reflect growing tension between minority or hybrid communities and ‘native’ 
communities. As this thesis will suggest, however, this instability will not be made right 
through policies which insist on assimilation to a one-dimensional cultural or national 
identity. At the same time, pluralistic legislation which seeks to integrate the legal 
systems of countless minority cultures is equally impractical and difficult to maintain. In 
both case studies, legislative amendments must find a middle ground which both defines 
the rights and obligations of citizenship in a democratic state, and protects minority 
interests.  
The final portion of the thesis will place the evaluations of the case study 
countries into the larger context of the European Union’s attempts to define its own 
Nationality Law. The thesis also explores the possibility of an EU constitution as a 
practical model for defining the rights and obligations of transnational citizenship.  
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The organizational structure of the project will consist of several thematic 
chapters, outlined below. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review and Main Concepts 
 I. State 
II. Citizenship 
III. Globalization 
III. Integration 
IV. Legal Pluralism  
Chapter 3: Case Study Review: An Evaluation of Immigration and Integration 
Legislation in the United Kingdom 
Chapter 4: Case Study Review: Challenges of Legal Pluralism in the Netherlands 
Chapter 5: Searching for E pluribus Unum: Democracy, Citizenship, and 
Constitutionality in the European Union 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Several thematic areas of literature guide the present analysis of European 
immigration and integration legislation. Though I have narrowed this thesis to two case 
studies, the theoretical background available on statehood, globalization, integration, 
pluralism, and citizenship is more generally reflective of global phenomena outside the 
case countries and the European continent. This portion of the thesis does not attempt to 
review the entirety of the literature on each of these subjects, but rather offers reflections 
on several elucidating texts within each field. As a whole, the chosen literature attempts 
to reflect the impact that globalization has had on state processes of democratic and 
multicultural citizenship. The final sections present several theoretical tools for managing 
difference through legal channels, and suggest limitations for their practical realization in 
democratic communities. 
The first portion of this chapter evaluates theories of statehood and state 
sovereignty, approaching the major questions and dilemmas that have emerged over time. 
The second section builds on these theories of statehood with an analysis of citizenship. 
The third portion analyzes the influential changes that globalization has on both statehood 
and citizenship, before introducing the more specific theories relevant to minority and 
immigrant integration in the fourth portion. The final section will analyze in more detail 
the concept of pluralism from a legal perspective—introducing two central texts as a 
framework for analysis. A few concluding statements will raise central theoretical 
questions that guide the thesis and the explorations of the case studies.  
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II. THE STATE 
Debates about state sovereignty are almost inseparable from modern academic 
conversations about globalization and law, and thus a discussion of ethnic minorities in 
European law would be wholly incomplete without some reference to theories on the 
state. In order to understand state legislation, it is first necessary to understand the 
debates about the state and its responsibilities. In particular, three areas of state theory 
emerge as essential contributions to the present discussion.  
The first essential theme in state theory labels the state as a center of power. As 
Joseph Camilleri notes, historical scholarship is divided on this issue.5 He identifies 
absolutist theorists like Bodin and Hobbes as scholars who define the state primarily as 
“individuals and institutions that exercise supreme authority within a given territory or 
society...identified with the power to make, administer, and enforce laws and with the 
network of institutions necessary for this purpose.”6 In contrast, he introduces Burke, 
Rousseau, and Hegel as theorists who understand the state as “not just the institutions of 
government but the politically organized society, the body politic, or the nation...the state 
is a community of free people based on an implicit or explicit consensus.”7 In both cases, 
states are endowed with a “supreme coercive power,” but this power is derived from a 
variety of different sources.8  
In the first, state power can be seen best through Weber’s definition of a state as a 
polity which “successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force within 
a given territory.”9 Hall argues that Weber references not the haphazard use of force, but 
the “sanctioned domination” that is arrived at through a combination of legitimacy and 
authority deemed acceptable to society.10 In this understanding, the center of power lies 
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within the state institutions themselves, rather than outside them. In the second, societal-
based understanding of the state, the primary centers of state power are located, if 
imperfectly, within the “body politic,” or a consensus-giving body of free individuals.11 
As Hall writes, state practices are legitimized through a system of law and “the forms 
through which the citizens are represented or agree by formal electoral procedures.”12 
Despite differences in understanding the appropriateness of using force and the centers of 
state power, both sides of the theoretical spectrum share an interest in the relationship 
between state power and state subjects. 
The common interest in the “body politic” between radically different schools of 
political theory brings us to a second theme important to the present discussion, namely 
the position of the individual and civil society in relation to the state. In the Hobbesian 
context, Camilleri notes that the concept of “a social contract between ruler and ruled” 
was “substituted for...a contract in which all individuals agreed to submit to the state.”13 
Under this type of social contract, the individual relationship with the state is one of 
submission, with few limits. In contrast, the Lockean branch of state theory takes a very 
different perspective on this contract, while maintaining the traditionalist views on state 
sovereignty. In the Lockean conception, “society and the state existed to preserve 
individual rights...and...such rights were a limitation on the authority of both state and 
society.”14 As Camilleri highlights, the Lockean understanding of the social contract 
places the power of the state in the consent of civil society—a consent which “could be 
given only in return for adequate protection of individual rights.”15  
This understanding of the relationship between society and the state informs the 
notion that “the whole machinery of the state was supposed to be activated and controlled 
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through law.”16 Poggi alludes to the power of law in mediating the relationship between 
state and subject when he writes “The activity of legislation itself...had aspects of utter 
discretionality, for it expressed the sovereign...will of the state. However...it was 
surrounded by constitutional constraints—both rules of procedure and sets of inviolable 
rights.”17 In short, the law represents a crucial medium for mediating the relationship 
between individuals and the unrestrained use of state force. Even when it is imperfect, 
law remains the textual representation of the state’s investment in the maintenance of 
social order.  
The law as a product of the sovereign state can protect or destroy the liberties 
associated with a Lockean social contract. When laws protecting individual liberties are 
enforced, the social contract is inevitably strengthened. When state disrespect for the law 
or restrictive legislation fails to support society as a whole, the social contract loses its 
potency. In the Hobbesian interpretation, maintaining sovereignty in law meant “doing 
away with every right of the people,” while Locke argued that sovereignty could only be 
maintained through respect for natural and moral laws that trumped state-created 
legislation.18  
Locke and Hobbes suggest two important roles for law in state theory. On one 
hand, law can buttress the sovereign will of the state, particularly when it is backed by 
state force. On the other hand, law can limit the powers of the state in favor of its 
citizens—protecting them and affirming their power as a part of civil society. Stuart Hall 
argues that the development of the modern state is characterized by “states in which 
power is shared; rights to participate in government are legally or constitutionally 
defined; representation is wide...and the boundaries of national sovereignty are clearly 
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defined.”19 He also highlights the supreme importance of individual liberties in the 
modern state. Where previous regimes had used law to overrun these liberties, the 
modern state was expected protect them, and “interference...could no longer be at the 
whim of crown or state, but had to be sanctioned legally. Even the state was subject to 
law.”20 The development of international organizations and international law has 
solidified this respect for the rights of the individual, though the power of the state’s 
sovereignty is continuously an obstacle to the protection of these internationally 
sanctioned rights, and the debate is far from complete.  
This discussion of the state is important to the present thesis for three reasons. 
First, debates about the role of law as a mediator between the sovereign state and 
individuals are essential to a discussion of modern states with diverse minority 
populations. In the two case studies analyzed, law is seen as a way to enforce the strict 
boundaries of the sovereign state, rather than as a dynamic medium for recreating the 
‘body politic’ and protecting individual liberties. Second, classical theories may offer 
insight into managing the challenges of citizenship in an era of globalization. Classical 
state theory suggests that the Hobbesian state with its strict boundaries and few liberties 
is not the only option, though modern states may emulate this model more frequently. 
Rather, theorists like Rousseau and Locke suggest that law and state sovereignty can be 
invested in the protection of a diverse body politic and individual liberties. In an era of 
globalization, this latter understanding may prove more fruitful, particularly if it 
encourages diverse democratic polities which balance the legal obligations of citizenship 
with respect for difference. Finally, a discussion of the state is important for purely 
practical reasons. Despite some scholarly predictions which suggest the end of the state, 
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the state continues to be the most important institution in international affairs which can 
maintain an effective social contract with the individual in the form of citizenship.  
 
III. CITIZENSHIP 
Citizenship, in its simplest form, connotes the “social contract” between a state 
and the individuals that are ruled by and create state institutions.21 As Poggi writes, 
citizenship is “a set of mutual claims and growing claims and reciprocal involvements 
binding together the state and the individuals.”22 Though definitions for citizenship have 
varied over time, most generally acknowledge citizenship as a relationship with “mutual 
rights and responsibilities.”23 Croucher, for example, identifies T.H. Marshall’s definition 
of the civil, political, and social rights associated with ideal citizenship as an increasingly 
influential guide for modern citizenship.24 Three debates about citizenship will guide this 
thesis. 
First, the concept of citizenship recalls the debates about state sovereignty and the 
social contract, with a particular focus on the role of civil society and individually 
protected rights as limits on state power. Alfonso Alfonsi identifies two forms of 
citizenship.25 The first, known as the “Aristotelian-republican model,” identifies citizens 
as “one who either takes, or is subject to decisions,” and who “can develop their own 
personal identity only within the framework of common traditions and recognized 
political institutions.”26 In the second “Lockean-liberal” model, “individuals remained 
external to the state, contributing to it in terms of certain rights and obligations...The state 
was, in its turn, to guarantee individual rights and equal treatment to its citizens.”27 In the 
first, the role of a citizen is incredibly limited, while in the second, the citizen is actively 
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involved in the creation and sustenance of the polity. The first seems to prevent an active 
civil society, while the second encourages it. Poggi writes: 
A potentially participant citizenry imposes powerful constraints on the autonomy 
of elites; and these constraints are probably all the more significant to the extent that the 
logic of social, economic and cultural advance calls forth...an increasingly diversified, 
informed, sophisticated, demanding citizenry.28  
 
The rights of participatory citizenship are even more important for multi-ethnic citizens 
in an era of globalization. The practices of citizenship give minorities a voice in state 
politics, and offer a set of ‘tools’ for maintaining hybrid identities.  
A second important facet of citizenship raises the question of ‘belonging’ and 
national identity, and the larger concept of the nation-state. Authors like Karl Deutsch 
and Charles Tilly have supported the association of citizenship with nationality, though 
T.K. Oommen’s theories are most useful for the current discussion with their argument 
that this association is both historically and currently problematic.29 In particular, 
Oommen discusses the “unstated assumption...that the population of a state ought to be 
homogeneous and its citizens should be nationals,” in cases where the terminology of the 
nation-state is used.30 In cases of historical state-sponsored movements toward 
nationalism, Oommen argues that “most states have not achieved their avowed objective 
of homogenization of their populations.”31 Nonetheless, efforts to fuse a static or 
homogenous identity with the geographical borders are far from exhausted, and current 
legal obstacles facing minority populations in Europe vividly illustrate these attempts.  
In an era of globalization, Oommen suggests that “While nationality and ethnicity 
as identities are exclusionary and could be inequality generating, citizenship can 
essentially be inclusionary and equality oriented.”32 In a similar vein, Habermas notes 
that citizenship can be defined as a fluid “‘patriotism of the constitution,’” in which “the 
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very concept of nation adapts itself gradually to the affirmation of citizenship.”33 In 
essence, the identity of the polity can be created and reaffirmed by its citizens through 
processes of citizenship. This is particularly the case in democratic societies, where, as 
James Rosenau highlights, “individuals...are deeply invested in the realization of both 
their own and society’s needs.”34 In the case of hybrid or ethnic minority ‘citizens,’ 
legislation might support both needs at the individual level, and request commitments to 
the larger societal and political needs of the country. 
A final and more current quandary about citizenship is introduced by the concept 
of transnational, or global citizenship. In addition to theories which suggest that states are 
losing their claim on sovereignty, scholarship on citizenship follows a similar argument 
in placing citizenship beyond state boundaries. In some cases, as in the European Union, 
non-state citizenship is no longer a theory—it exists in fact, though it remains difficult to 
catalogue “as postnational, or supranational or merely a sophisticated set of 
intergovernmental agreements that mimic federal arrangements.”35 European Union 
citizenship is associated with a variety of civil, political, and social rights, including the 
right to vote in European elections, though state citizenship has not changed, and 
European Union citizenship is given only to the citizens of the EU member states.36 
Though the European Union removes the concept of citizenship from its traditional state 
boundaries, authors like Seyla Benhabib argue that political rights are still largely linked 
to the nation-state, and more importantly, membership in such a political community.37  
Benhabib and other authors like Peter Singer look to the concept of global 
citizenship as an effective way of building global communities endowed with both rights 
and global responsibilities.38 Both Singer39 and Benhabib40 cite Kant’s theories on 
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Perpetual Peace in their advocacy of global institutions of citizenship and global 
communities. Benhabib examines the role of the state as an institution of political 
membership, and argues that “New modalities of membership have emerged, with the 
result that the boundaries of the political community, as defined by the nation-state 
system, are no longer adequate to regulate membership.”41 Singer makes a similar 
argument, though he suggests that numerous political problems contribute to the 
necessity of a global government and community that can adequately confront such 
pressing issues as global climate change and the enforcement of international law. 
International institutions, global problems, and transnational cultures all contribute to a 
redefined concept of citizenship, particularly for individuals who constantly cross 
political borders. The larger concepts of transnational and global citizenship are two 
admirable possibilities, though a more state-based concept of citizenship is still necessary 
in the absence of international institutions which can uphold a ‘social contract’ or provide 
essential goods and services.  
The discussion of citizenship is important to the present thesis precisely because 
of its growing flexibility in an age of globalization. Never before has the possibility of a 
social contract which goes beyond the state been in reach. Though perhaps still far off, 
the possibility may be increasingly attractive to individuals whose interests (like 
minorities) are not being met by traditional state systems. 
 
IV. GLOBALIZATION 
Many early definitions of globalization have labeled complex technologies and 
economic flows as the most significant features of the new global phenomenon. In 
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contrast, others have labeled the movement of people and cultures as a driving force. Two 
central impacts of globalization are essential to the present work.  
First, globalization has had, and is having, profound impacts on the state as a 
political and social institution, and on the practice of politics itself. Peter Singer argues 
that this change results from the growth in international political and economic 
institutions, international law, and the necessity of cooperative action in an effort to 
resolve widespread global problems.42 In short, globalization has opened up the political 
sphere to an international community. The state is no longer offering a monologue on the 
world stage, and in cases of terrorism or private military groups, it no longer has a 
monopoly on the use of force, legitimate or otherwise. State leaders negotiate with other 
state leaders, but they also negotiate as frequently with representatives from non-
governmental organizations, with civil society groups, and with national and 
transnational corporations. The greatest security threats for a state in the 21st century are 
not limited to weapons proliferation, or even military conflict, but include the risks of 
environmental crisis, HIV/AIDS, global poverty, and dozens of other internationally 
pressing issues.  
Sheila Croucher captures the impact of these realities by referencing Keohane and 
Nye’s interdependence theories, which suggest that states have become dependent on 
each other, both as a result of “resource needs, such as oil,” and a larger “degree of 
coordination and cooperation among states that is not reducible to the realist model of 
brute power relations.”43 More specifically, Keohane and Nye argue that international 
politics in an era of modernization (or globalization) can be explained by a condition of 
complex interdependence in which “transnational actors are increasingly important, 
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military force is a less useful instrument, and welfare—not security—is becoming the 
primary goal and concern of states.”44 Whether the realities of interdependence are 
successfully managed, however, is a continuously debated question, particularly in a 
post-September 11 world when issues of global security and international welfare erupt 
violently when they are left unresolved. 
Despite the importance of international actors and global problems, the state has 
not disappeared, but must navigate the chaotic maelstroms of globalization’s storm. As 
Joseph Camilleri writes, globalization does not herald the end of the state, but makes it 
increasingly difficult for states to maintain “old” democratic institutions in the process.45 
Though he wrote over ten years ago, he captures vividly the moment of great political 
change that continues to challenge states today. Camilleri writes: 
The contemporary period is one of considerable fluidity, when the most 
fundamental questions regarding the exercise of power and authority have been 
thrown back into the crucible of history...old habits and old ideas will persist even 
as new ones develop to cope with the emergence of a pluralistic polity that is at 
once part local, part regional, part national, and part transnational.46 
 
In a sense, globalization has re-opened the classical debates about state power and 
sovereignty, civil rights, and the power of law. These debates are particularly critical in 
an analysis of globalization’s impact on the individual and identity. Hybrid identities and 
transnational attachments complicate the traditional processes of democratic life—but 
they also make concrete foundations of democracy more essential.  
The second important facet of globalization for the present discussion is its ability 
to redefine the nature of citizenship, complicate individual identity, and as a result, 
change the face of national identity. This process is in part a practical one. As Stephen 
Castles writes, “Well over 100 million people live outside their countries of birth today. 
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Some 20 million of them are refugees,” and these migrants contribute significantly to 
“the formation of new ethnic groups in receiving countries.”47 With the advance in 
transportation and communication technologies, as well as the increase in refugee 
populations and migrant flows, migration has become a more prominent reality for many 
Western countries.48 
In addition, globalization has had the more intangible effect of changing the 
identity of migrants. Ulrich Beck writes that the sovereignty of the territorial state “is 
grounded upon attachment to a particular place,” while globalization encourages global 
networks, and a global society of networks—“none of them specific to any particular 
locality” and which “cut across the boundaries of the national state.”49 Though the nation-
state has certainly not become obsolete, Beck argues that globalization introduces the 
possibility of a “cosmopolitan society” in which citizens worldwide are bound in “a 
global nexus of responsibility” to each other.50 In addition to this possibility, 
globalization also facilitates what he calls “transnational place polygamy,” and 
“globalization of biography.”51 He defines ‘transnational place polygamy’ as a “marriage 
to several places at once, belonging in different worlds...the gateway to globality in one’s 
own life; it leads to the globalization of biography.”52 One only has to walk down a 
cosmopolitan city street to realize the truth of Beck’s claims. Whether globalization of 
biography occurs in German-Ethiopian, Polish-English, or Czech-Italian families, the 
transnationality and diversity of attachments are too numerous to count. Equally valuable 
for political scientists is the increasing frequency of successful cultural hybrids. For states 
seeking to define a homogenous national identity, however, the globalization of 
biographies is inevitably one of the greatest challenges to state sovereignty because it 
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means that the oppositions between “separate worlds (nations, religions, cultures, skin 
colours, continents, etc.)...must or may lodge in a single life.”53 Resolving and learning to 
accept these oppositions will be critical to navigating statehood in an era of globalization. 
‘Globalization of biography’ may mean the acquisition of dual citizenship, but it 
is also a more inherent transnational identity that resists boundaries. To the state seeking 
to maintain its sovereign and homogenous authority, this facet of globalization could 
prove insurmountable, particularly as globalization increases more diverse cultural 
pairings and amalgams through global communication, immigration, and the movement 
of individuals from around the world. In the endeavor to define a world community of 
interdependent states, however, cosmopolitan citizens with globalized biographies could 
be an asset in bridging the gap between the old sovereignty and the new.  
 
V. INTEGRATION 
Though the present thesis approaches topics central to state structures (in 
particular the law), globalization, and citizenship, it also seeks to provide a theory-based 
analysis of the integration and citizenship programs in each of the two case countries. 
Two authors are central to my theoretical analysis. The first theories of integration are 
advanced by Stephen Castles in his book Ethnicity and Globalization.54 Additional 
theories are introduced by Robert Waters in his book Ethnic Minorities and the Criminal 
Justice System.55 
Stephen Castles advances one additional redefinition of the relationship between 
the state and the individual in his definition of multicultural citizenship as “a system of 
rights and obligations which protects the integrity of the individual while recognizing that 
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individuality is formed in a variety of social and cultural contexts.”56 Multicultural 
citizenship seems to parallel James Rosenau’s definition of democratic citizenship, 
though Castles’ definition is more sensitive to the specificities of migrant and minority 
cultures in the modern state system.57 Castles also approaches the difficult problems of 
integration, and his theories inform the interpretations of the case studies in the later 
chapters of the thesis. He outlines three “ideal models” for the integration of immigrant 
communities in Western culture: “differential exclusion, assimilation, and pluralism.”58 
The first, and perhaps most important is “differential exclusion,” or “a situation in 
which immigrants are incorporated into certain areas of society (above all the labour 
market) but denied access to others (such as welfare systems, citizenship and political 
participation).”59 Furthermore, he clarifies differential exclusion in the legal realm by 
noting that “Exclusion may be effected through legal mechanisms (refusal of 
naturalization and sharp distinctions between the rights of citizens and non-citizens) or 
through informal practices (racism and discrimination). Immigrants become ethnic 
minorities, which are excluded from full participation in society.”60 The distinction 
between legal and informal mechanisms of exclusion is vital to the present thesis, as the 
legal obstacles Castles mentions will be central to the discussion of the case studies.  
Castles’ second model for integration is assimilation, which he identifies in the 
short-term as: 
The policy of incorporating migrants into society through a one-sided process of 
adaptation: immigrants are expected to give up their distinctive linguistic, cultural 
or social characteristics and become indistinguishable from the majority 
population. Immigrants can become citizens only if they give up their group 
identity.61  
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Castles also identifies a specific long-term “integration” goal in many European countries 
which places an emphasis on gradual rather than immediate assimilation, though the 
emphasis on the shedding of cultural identities is the same.62 Castles highlights the 
importance of a colonial history on the emergence of policies of assimilation in countries 
like Great Britain, and notes that “ideas on citizenship, civil rights and political 
participation” are tied to a larger image of cultural belonging and the perception of a 
“common culture.”63  
 A third model for integration, labeled “pluralism,” is often a result of government 
realizations that assimilation models were not effective in encouraging a sustainable 
diverse population.64 Upon legal acceptance into society through immigration, Castles 
argues that pluralistic communities accept: 
Immigrant populations as ethnic communities which remain distinguishable from 
the majority population with regard to language, culture and social 
organization...Pluralism implies that immigrants should be granted equal rights in 
all spheres of society, without being expected to give up their diversity...with an 
expectation of conformity to certain key values.65 
 
Though pluralism is understood to be a single model which maintains the diversity of 
immigrant communities, pluralistic polices are not always uniform, as different levels of 
assistance for the maintenance of cultural practices exists in various case studies.66  
 The second important author who contributes theoretical models of integration to 
my analysis of case studies is Robert Waters. Though he approaches the theme of 
immigrant communities and ethnic minorities from the more narrow perspective of the 
criminal justice system, he offers several conceptual models for understanding the 
adjustment process that occurs as immigrant communities are accepted into larger 
society.67 Waters maintains the theoretical assimilation and pluralism models used by 
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Castles, though he includes a specific model for “integration,” in which minority 
communities build cultural enclaves within the larger society, “at the price of having an 
‘exclusive’ boundary placed around it...by the majority group.”68 In his model for 
pluralism, Waters highlights the possibility of “belonging” and “dual membership to both 
the majority and the minority groups” in a number of economic and social rights areas.69 
 Notably, neither Waters nor Castles introduces a separate model for reciprocal 
pluralism, in which both the majority and minority contribute to national identity 
formation. Castles’ active definition of pluralism, in which “explicit multicultural 
policies...imply the willingness of the majority group to accept cultural difference, and to 
adapt national identity and institutional structures,” comes close, but it says very little 
about the combined expectations of encouraging cultural difference while maintaining the 
cornerstones of the majority’s political heritage.70 Indeed, both authors seem to dismiss 
the importance of cultural adaptation and redefinition that happens naturally in dynamic 
societies, and there seems to be a lack of theoretical “middle ground” between the 
maintenance of cultural diversity and majority institutions.  
This absence of a middle ground between assimilation and pluralism is 
particularly problematic where minority and hybrid communities in the case studies are 
concerned. Assimilation and pluralism in their ideal forms rarely, if ever, exist in 
democratic societies. Legislation based entirely on assimilation runs the risk of denying 
minorities basic human rights. At the same time, a wholly pluralistic polity risks crippling 
itself and its institutions through the adoption of too many legal codes. In many cases, the 
result of using such ideal types as models for legislation is the creation of imperfectly 
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supported hybrid communities who feel no real obligations of citizenship. The problem 
of legal pluralism continues to challenge legislators, scholars, and citizens.  
 
VI. LEGAL PLURALISM 
Without an acceptable theoretical definition of pluralism, the problem of 
negotiating difference within a state’s legal structures becomes even more difficult. Using 
Castles’ and Waters’ definitions, Western legal systems could entirely exclude minority 
practices, or be consumed by them. Within the spectrum of pluralism, state legislators run 
the risk of handicapping their own systems of law and democracy by introducing a 
variety of autonomous cultural systems, or they risk alienating minority communities 
through their unfamiliarity with diverse practices. Benhabib captures the difficulty 
between valuing universally championed “rights” on one hand, and valuing an organized 
and effective polity that can enforce these rights on the other. She writes that 
“universalists and cosmopolitans judge the closed-door policies of the wealthy nations of 
Europe and North America to be forms of organized hypocrisy” while “decline-of-
citizenship theorists point to values such as the rule of law, a vibrant civic culture, and 
active citizenship, which are equally important.”71 In the difficult balance between 
assimilation and pluralism, the law seems to offer few answers, though legal scholars 
continue to search for adequate integration models. 
Two of the most comprehensive resources I have found on legal pluralism are 
Werner Menski’s Comparative Law in a Global Context and Prakash Shah’s Legal 
Pluralism in Conflict.72 Menski notes that “globalization appears to have created hybrid 
results rather than uniformity, leading in political science terms to a bifurcated, 
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multicentric world,” and that “enlightened universalism...must mean and involve intrinsic 
respect for plurality and diversity.”73 In light of globalization’s impacts and the debates 
over pluralism in Western societies, Menski argues that in law, some pluralism is 
unavoidable, and must be approached from “a radical view of equity as a foundation for 
ultimate equality...finding justice from case to case over rigid adherence to precedent.”74 
Menski argues for a social science approach to law, and advocates Masaji Chiba’s 
“tripartite model of law” as a way to understand universal, Western, and other official 
legal systems “as interacting with unofficial laws and legal postulates. None of these 
elements ever exists in isolation; they continuously interact in dynamic fashion. Law, 
thus, is always plural.”75 This approach to legal systems suggests that “law,” even if 
official can never be wholly separated from identity, nor can it remain static in the face of 
difference. Menski also introduces Chiba’s concept of the “identity postulate of a legal 
culture, which guides a people in choosing how to reformulate the whole structure of 
their law...in order to maintain their accommodation to changing circumstances.”76 This 
concept of ‘identity postulates’ is a valuable theory for understanding the possibility of 
legal pluralism in Western societies, in part because it suggests that Western systems of 
governance and diverse individuals are already equipped to manage difference. 
Prakash Shah brings Chiba’s concept of the identity postulate into the context of 
state sovereignty and British law.77 He notes that “competition between different 
postulates, whether in space or in theory, is unavoidable, and...these postulates must 
reach accommodation or integration under a more inclusive one.”78 Shah complicates 
Chiba’s definitions of pluralism, however, by reintroducing the concept of state 
sovereignty and seeking an “identity postulate” in the case of a Western legal system 
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“which faces the inescapable fact of the transplantation of ‘foreign’ legal cultures on the 
soil over which it seeks to assert territorial jurisdiction.”79 Shah argues that in the British 
case, immigration law and “race relations law” are “the chief elements of the...strategy 
for coping with legal pluralism.”80 As this thesis will argue, the use of immigration and 
integration legislation to “cope with” or resist pluralism is not unique to Great Britain, 
and the possibility of pluralism is greatly complicated by the modern state system. A 
balanced model between assimilation and pluralism could nurture both plural legal 
frames of reference and maintain the strength of democratic state systems.  
 A unique contrast to Menski and Shah’s arguments is provided by Peter Singer. 
Though Menski and Shah seem to reject a universalist view of international law, Singer 
offers the philosophical, rather than legal view, that it is not useful to become tangled in 
discussions about moral relativism and “cultural imperialism.”81 Singer suggests instead 
that these discussions should be framed in a way that “allows for the possibility of moral 
argument beyond the boundaries of one’s own culture.”82 Singer argues that such 
universal discussions are essential to the development of global ethical principles for a 
that are “sound, defensible, and justifiable,” while still being sensitive to and informed by 
a diversity of cultures and opinions.83 Furthermore, he notes that “some aspects of ethics 
can fairly be claimed to be universal, or very nearly so,” and these can aid in the creation 
of guidelines for state participation in an international community.84 The creation of 
global respect for “one law,” as he calls it, is only one dimension of global change 
necessary in an effort to “respond ethically to the idea that we live in one world.”85 While 
Menski and Shah’s theoretical models approach the problem of difference from within 
state legal structures, Singer argues for the creation of a larger law that goes beyond the 
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capacity and reach of states. Singer’s theories are valid in supporting the creation of a 
stronger European Union citizenship to supplement state citizenship.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The growth of significant ethnic minority populations in both Great Britain and 
the Netherlands as a result of globalization raises several significant questions about both 
the integration of difference and the state system itself. The literature and theories 
identified here inform the analysis of the two case studies presented in the thesis. In 
summary, the literature on the state, citizenship, and globalization suggests a changed 
role for the state in maintaining its relationship with its citizens. Globalization has 
transformed state populations, but the state remains the primary guarantor of democratic 
rights associated with citizenship. The literature on integration models and legal 
pluralism suggest an unclear path for the state as it navigates its new responsibilities. 
Torn between ideal models for assimilation and pluralism, and faced with growing hybrid 
communities, states are left with legal structures that offer little hope for integrating 
highly diverse populations into common practices of citizenship.  
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CHAPTER 3 
CASE STUDY REVIEW: AN EVALUATION OF IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION 
LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Where the United Kingdom is concerned, Roger Ballard writes, “What is 
clear…is that the United Kingdom is by definition a multi-national society, even if it is 
one within which the English have long enjoyed a position of…unquestioned 
hegemony.”86 Despite a long history of multicultural and global exchange, heated debates 
about cultural pluralism and British identity are central to political and academic research 
in the UK today. The present historical moment demands a new approach from Great 
Britain—perhaps not all that different from the American project of “the great melting 
pot” envisioned so long ago. Unlike the United States, however, Great Britain is only 
now being forced to confront the changing cultural and ethnic makeup of its democratic 
society. Minority communities of varying generations have sought to redefine their own 
cultures in order to form “hybrids” with British traditions, and have succeeded to varying 
degrees. In some cases, members of minority groups are appreciated as an actively 
involved part of the British population. In other cases, particularly those that spark 
hostility in the national media, minority groups have difficulty meeting the expectations 
of British society.  
Britain’s minorities are not the only communities undergoing change. Great 
Britain has also tried to define itself as a multicultural polity. Immediately following the 
independence movements of many British colonies, Great Britain had relatively liberal 
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immigration and integration policies, though these shifted as minorities became less 
inclined to adopt British traditions and practices. In an effort to protect national 
institutions, traditions, language, and identity, the British government turned to 
immigration and integration legislation to limit the influx of migration. Unfortunately, the 
attempt to rigidly define national British identity through legal standards limits the 
successful cultural, ethnic, and civic integration of minorities, and the challenges 
continue to increase as globalization further diversifies the British population.  
According to the BBC and official estimated statistics, the year 2006 brought 
record highs in immigration and emigration to the UK.87 Over 591,000 individuals 
crossed UK borders to stay for a year or more in a wave of immigration that was offset 
only by an exodus of around 400,000 individuals.88 Government statistics reveal that 
343,000 (over half) of the incoming immigrants were non-British or non-European.89 In 
stark contrast to such diverse immigration, the BBC notes that “just over half of those 
leaving were British.”90 The BBC notes several patterns, the first of which is that 
“Because so many people emigrated the rate of population growth has been the lowest for 
three years.”91 Secondly, they note that these statistics illustrate a larger “pattern of long-
term massive movements of people in and out of the UK.” Neither the BBC nor the 
British government is quite sure what to make of these statistics. While the article reveals 
a tendency to push legislation limiting non-European immigration, it also quotes a 
government official who argues that: 
No-one has a real grasp of where or for how long migrants are settling...The speed 
and scale of migration combined with the shortcomings of official population 
figures is placing pressure on funding for services...This can even lead to 
unnecessary tension and conflict.92 
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Regardless of their clarity, such statistics and their reflection of societal conditions have a 
tangible impact on the legislation and official responses to the reception of non-European 
immigrants in Great Britain. Without a clear idea of what common services are needed, 
or even what problems exist with the current minority population, it is difficult for the 
British government to support a multicultural community democratically. Furthermore, if 
minorities are unable or unaware of the resources available to them, or if they feel they 
cannot participate in democratic life effectively, they may quickly feel disenfranchised, 
and be an increasing problem for the British population and government.  
The quoted statistics illustrate only the most recent example of a longer trend of 
globalized migration that has increased rapidly over the past few decades. Despite a long 
history of migration, and a collection of increasingly restrictive legislation measures, 
Great Britain seems no closer to managing its non-European migration than it was ten 
years ago. As this case study will illustrate, Great Britain’s population has become 
globalized, but its immigration and integration laws have not followed suit. The UK is 
already home to a large and diverse ethnic minority population, and British legislation 
seeks to manage this population by closing its doors, rather than by focusing on 
integration through strengthening its democratic processes. As this chapter will argue, 
Britain has articulated a policy of assimilation through its strict immigration and 
integration controls. Though immigration policies apply to non-citizens and non-
residents, Britain’s policies have not been combined with either integration or pluralistic 
policies for already existing communities. The result is a growing migrant community 
that is partly “forced” to be hybrid, without adequate support structures that could 
increase respect for the British political system. Those minorities who are given 
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citizenship rights are rarely taught the value of democratic participation, and state 
legislation directed at bridging racial or ethnic divides has been limited or inconsistent. 
The greater portion of this chapter will focus on Great Britain’s immigration policies as 
the clearest illustration of strict integration rhetoric, along with a brief discussion of 
attempts at pluralism through race relations will also be included.  
This chapter will begin with an outline of the multicultural and ethnic minority 
presence in the United Kingdom. A second section will explore the historic foundations 
of state-created legal obstacles to their immigration and citizenship. The third section will 
review the most recent government perspectives on immigration. A final section will 
reflect on the absence of consistent integration policies with respect to an existing ethnic 
minority population, and will discuss the implications of British immigration legislation 
for this community. 
 
II. HISTORY OF MULTICULTURALISM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 The Institute for Public Policy Research estimates that 678,000 individuals born 
outside of the United Kingdom call London home.93 Even with the existence of diverse 
cities like London, and statistics which suggest a non-White ethnic minority presence of 
almost 8% across the whole of the United Kingdom, the struggle to welcome difference 
is still very real for politicians and policymakers. The problem is shouldered both by 
minority citizens themselves, as well as by the British government. Minorities and British 
politicians are equally frustrated by the apparent disconnect that separates them. The 
British government feels threatened by radical and fundamentalist members of minority 
religious groups, and minority groups feel equally threatened by British demands that 
they adopt cultural and educational traditions divergent from their own. Some minority 
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groups have become relatively integrated into society, while others prefer to remain in 
isolated cultural enclaves. In either case, Great Britain as a whole continues to struggle 
with a changing political and societal community that is managed imperfectly by 
immigration and integration legislation. 
 As a result of Britain’s colonial past, the issue of migration and citizenship has 
almost always been a prominent one in British legislation. As Randall Hansen notes, “at 
the empire’s peak in the twentieth century some 600 000 000 individuals had the 
technical right to enter the UK and avail themselves of all the rights now associated with 
British citizenship.”94 Though small groups of minority communities existed before the 
1940s, much of the significant immigration occurred under the 1948 British Nationality 
Act, which still maintained the rights of colonial subjects to enter the UK freely.95 From 
1948 until 1962, the existing British Nationality Act supported the entrance of over 
500,000 non-white British subjects from the Commonwealth.  
As ethnic minority communities grew, they were recognized as the foundations of 
a multicultural society. Throughout the 1950s, however, the liberal British perspective on 
the freedoms of Commonwealth subjects began to change.96  Legislation in 1962 
increased immigration controls and discouraged non-white migrants seeking entry to the 
UK.97 Though a variety of legal developments now discourage multicultural migration, 
Great Britain has not been able to neglect its significant multicultural community. 
European migration has also played a role in the development of an ethnic minority 
presence, while migration from New Commonwealth countries in the West Indies, the 
Indian subcontinent, and East Africa solidify Britain’s status as a multicultural polity.98 
As Hansen notes, the predominantly non-white immigration from ‘new’ Commonwealth 
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countries peaked in the 1960s. Legislation responding to the growth of the minority 
presence also became more obvious at this point in Britain’s history.99  
Despite legislative changes that continue today, Britain’s multicultural 
community continues to grow both in size and diversity. According to the 2001 Census, 
half of the UK’s non-white ethnic minority population is of Indian, Pakistani, or 
Bangladeshi origin.100 This amounts to over 3 percent of the UK’s total population. 
Additionally, just under two percent of the total population, or around 25 percent of the 
ethnic minority population, represents black Caribbean and black African 
communities.101  Individuals with mixed ethnic identity represent 1.2 percent of Great 
Britain’s total population, and account for approximately 15 percent of the ethnic 
minority presence in the UK.102 As current events and security concerns prompt worries 
over a diversifying population, Britain’s policy makers and academics continue to 
struggle with the subject of ethnicity in law. The current failure to accommodate 
difference and define a dynamic British identity suggests that the UK, like other 
European nations, is finding it difficult to navigate a road towards pluralism.  
 
III. LEGAL OBSTACLES 
 In order to better evaluate the history of immigration and the ethnic minority 
presence in the UK, several pieces of British legislation beginning with the 1962 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act will be discussed here. While the entirety of British 
immigration legislation cannot be included, I have attempted to select and review legal 
examples which have had a wide-reaching impact on the nature of British responses to 
multi-ethnic citizenship. Each piece of legislation was passed in response to a perceived 
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need on the part of the British populace to protect its borders or define its community, 
sometimes with legitimate cause. As decades have passed however, globalization has 
influenced the growth of a thriving hybrid cultural population which has not been 
adequately nurtured by British legislators. 
 
1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act 
The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act marked the first time that immigration 
and nationality legislation defined British nationality in terms of United Kingdom 
residency and ‘belonging,’ rather than by official citizenship and passport possession.103 
The Act was the beginning of Britain’s efforts to define its identity in the post-colonial 
era. For the British, redefining their nationality and immigration legislation was one way 
to separate their democratic institutions and national personality from the newly 
independent colonies. It also had the practical advantage, from the British perspective, of 
securing British territorial boundaries against a potential influx of colonial migrants. 
Within the historical context, then, the legislative changes can be seen has territorially 
and practically sensible. In many ways, Great Britain’s legislation at this time mirrors the 
post-colonial independence movements—though the British themselves are seeking to 
define their own identity and independence in the absence of their colonies.  
While the practical implications of the Act for the British were no doubt positive 
overall, the impact of the Act viewed retrospectively and through the close lens of 
globalization offers a different picture. While labor was widely solicited during the 
colonial period, the 1962 Act changed the face of British immigration by introducing a 
system of labor vouchers which policed the entry of unskilled workers.104 Furthermore, as 
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Randall Hansen writes, the most important impact of the 1962 legislation was to deny 
“millions of largely non-white ‘colonial’ British subjects across the globe” the rights and 
opportunities normally associated with British nationality.105 The 1962 Act was the first 
of many changes which would radically redefine British immigration and integration law. 
It is also the first Act which began to devalue British citizenship and identity for a 
significant portion of Great Britain’s colonial citizens.  
 
1971 Immigration Act  
 The second significant change in British legislation was the 1971 Immigration 
Act. The 1971 Immigration Act officially codified the earlier Acts in the 1960s, and 
introduced a system of Immigration “Rules” that, though not legislation, could be used as 
legal guidance for the arbitrary administration of the Act.106 Though the substance of the 
legislation had not changed significantly from 1962 until 1971, the national perception of 
minorities had, and this is reflected in the official language of the Act. Both the British 
population and their leaders in government began to realize that a sizable population of 
minorities was intent on making Great Britain their permanent home. Though the 
migratory numbers were smaller than they are today, the 1970s represent a mindset shift 
from simply managing migration to almost entirely closing the doors, particularly where 
minorities from previous colonies were concerned.  
The 1971 Act had the most serious consequences for Commonwealth subjects 
seeking entry into the UK. While the 1962 Act established the recognition of differences 
between passports issued under UK central authorities and those issued by colonial 
offices, the 1971 Act reinforced these differences through a new concept known as 
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‘patriality.’107 Beginning with the 1971 Act, Commonwealth subjects seeking entry 
clearance to the UK needed to prove that either they or their parents or grandparents were 
born on UK soil.108 In short, the 1971 Act had the permanent effect of placing 
“Commonwealth citizens on the same legal footing as aliens for the purposes of 
immigration.”109 The 1971 Act further stripped away the “rights” associated with 
citizenship in the eyes of growing minority communities from the colonies. 
For many Commonwealth subjects from former British colonies in Africa, the 
impact of the 1971 Act was particularly acute. Indeed, the 1971 Act was initially 
conceived as a way to quell the official and public resistance to the possibility of mass 
immigration of Kenyan Asians with British nationality to the United Kingdom following 
Africanization policies in Kenya.110 Nuruddin Farah also notes that opposition to African 
migration was later repeated when the British Nationality Act of 1981 was passed in 
response to the immigration of Ugandan Asians following their expulsion from Uganda 
under Idi Amin’s rule.111 Though the 1971 Act was not a direct result of the Ugandan 
crisis which occurred in 1972, Ugandan Asians, many of whom also held British 
passports, were either accepted into the UK as refugees or were turned away if they could 
not prove patriality under the stringent provisions of the 1971 Act.112 Nonetheless, the 
1971 Act had obvious implications for Commonwealth citizens seeking protection from 
their governments, particularly in cases where independence movements brought civil 
unrest and governmental instability.  
From the perspective of the Commonwealth, the 1971 legislation meant an 
oppressive immigration regime which closed the doors of British legal rights to anyone 
who could not prove patrial family lineage, UK birth, or a five year residence permitted 
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by labor vouchers.113 In contrast, Great Britain may also have viewed the 1971 Act as a 
way to prepare itself for the arrival of European migrants upon its entry into the European 
Union in 1973.  As Sanjiv Sachdeva notes, the 1971 Act reflected a move toward 
European Economic Community provisions which gave European citizens primacy over 
that of the colonial states.114 Britain’s efforts to meet the demands of European Union 
membership are not enough, however, to excuse the global implications of the 1971 Act. 
As Nuruddin Farah writes, the 1971 Act had a clearly “racist logic” underneath it—a 
logic that meant “one was treated differently if one came from what was referred to as the 
Old Commonwealth...Ready to join...the European Community, Britain has lately 
negotiated away its imperial responsibility.”115 Whether the 1971 Immigration Act is a 
matter of Britain’s successful European integration or one of post-colonial 
irresponsibility, the atmosphere of exclusion it has created for Commonwealth and 
minority immigrants continues to exist today. 
 
The Primary Purpose Rule: A Bridge Between Decades 
One of the most controversial, yet relatively unstudied, legal developments in 
British immigration legislation is the Primary Purpose Rule.116 As Andrew Geddes 
writes, this rule was created by conservative political leaders in 1980 as a way to give 
“immigration authorities the power to prove the ‘real’ status and reasons for an 
application to enter the UK for purposes of marriage.”117 This rule is important to the 
present study because it illustrates the shift between viewing colonial migrants as a 
territorial challenge to that of a cultural or ethnic one, even if this challenge was more 
one of perception than reality. Following the end of legitimate labor migration, the 
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British government saw a massive increase in the number of secondary migrants seeking 
visas as spouses or family members of UK residents, and legislation during this time 
period sought to control this influx.118 Earlier British legislation that sought to limit 
immigration was “based on the assumption that men were the breadwinners and women 
were dependants who would follow their husbands.”119 The primary purpose legislation 
grew out of legal challenges by the European Court of Human Rights, which ruled that 
British legislation was discriminating based on sex.120  
Through the Primary Purpose Rule, the British government sought to limit the 
entry of individuals, regardless of gender, whose marriages were based on labor or 
economic incentives.121 The Rule was removed from British legislation in 1997, 
following a change of government, though its effects were certainly felt during the two 
decades of its existence.122 Minority families were hit particularly hard, with little 
protection from British law. As Geddes argues, “There was no constitutional protection 
of the rights of the family” in the United Kingdom “because there is not a formal, written 
UK constitution. Family migration was provided for by statute.”123 Sanjiv Sachdeva 
argues that the Rule was indicative of a larger trend in British immigration legislation that 
targeted minority communities, writing: 
British Immigration control, in the cleft stick between upholding basic human 
rights and protecting the legitimate concerns of a national interest, has quite 
apparently yet to learn that public interest in Britain now includes the concerns of 
the various non-white and non-English minorities.124 
 
Indeed, the Primary Purpose Rule was a small glimpse into the increasingly restrictive 
immigration legislation that would permanently redefine British citizenship for post-
colonial minorities in the 1980s. 
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1981 Nationality Act 
 Perhaps the most important recent legal development after the 1962 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act is the British Nationality Act of 1981. The 1981 Act 
radically redefined the legislation surrounding nationality and citizenship in the UK and 
the Commonwealth. Its most important effect was to replace the more liberal 1948 British 
Nationality Act with three new types of citizenship that made permanent distinctions 
between full British (or patrial) citizenship, British Dependent Territories Citizenship, 
and British Overseas Citizenship.125 As Andrew Geddes writes, the creation of official 
British Overseas Citizenship (or BOC) stripped Commonwealth citizens in East Africa of 
any rights associated with their ties to the British.126 For the countless individuals who 
had once been considered British nationals under colonial rule, the 1981 legislation 
meant that their British ‘citizenship’ no longer had any rights associated with it.127 In the 
end, even the strictest legislation embodied by the 1981 Act could not completely close 
Britain’s doors to the flow of family members and asylum seekers who would cross its 
borders in the decades to follow the new Nationality Act.  
 
Legislation from 1993 to Today 
While the challenges regarding the immigration of British Overseas Citizens have 
not disappeared altogether, more modern attempts to control immigration have centered 
on the control of asylum applications. The 1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act, 
the 1996 Asylum and Immigration Act, and four additional Acts on immigration and 
asylum between 1999 and 2006 are the most recent attempts to manage immigration in 
the UK. While the impact of the earlier Acts can be evaluated, the scholarly research on 
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the most recent Acts is limited. The 1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act was the 
first to respond to massive increases in immigration during the period from 1989-1993. 
The first impact of this Act was to introduce a body of legislation that dealt specifically 
with “the backlog of asylum cases” that confronted UK officials in the early 1990s.128 
The legislation limited not only the number of asylum-seekers who were given official 
refugee status, but also withdrew the government provisions of housing for asylum-
seekers.129 The 1993 Act did not officially have an impact on the number of applications 
for asylum overall—indeed the applications continued to rise dramatically after 1993.130 
Contrary to its intent, the 1993 Act had the impact of increased refusals and a decrease in 
the numbers of asylum-seekers given Exceptional Leave to Remain, or ELR. As a Home 
Office report notes, “In 1993, 48 per cent of initial decisions were to grant ELR and 46 
per cent were refused asylum. In 1995, 16 percent were granted ELR while 79 per cent 
were refused.”131  
 The Asylum and Immigration Act of 1996 also sought to limit asylum 
applications by denying many asylum seekers welfare and housing benefits, and the 
absence of government efforts to remedy the social and economic deprivation that 
plagued the majority of asylum communities placed crushing responsibility on local 
organizations which developed temporary, improvised, and un-coordinated solutions to 
widespread problems.132 Additionally, the 1996 Act removed the right of appeal within 
the UK for asylum-seekers who first traveled through another country considered “safe” 
by immigration officials before arriving in the UK.133 Overall, as Andrew Geddes 
observes, each new asylum Act passed between 1993 and today has “sought to correct the 
errors of the previous legislation.”134 The result, in the end, is a collection of asylum 
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legislation which seeks both to close off external borders and build more complicated 
internal measures for discouraging asylum applications.135 Despite a legacy of tough 
legislation, however, the newest legislation passed in 2002 may hold some promise for a 
successfully multicultural Britain. The 2002 legislation in particular began to seek out 
alternative routes to “positive immigration” in the form of the Highly Skilled Migrants 
Program, and increased attention to anti-discrimination legislation may also encourage 
new approaches to pluralism in the UK.136 Despite moderate improvements, the most 
recent programs for ‘managing migration’ may be a step in the wrong direction. 
 
IV. A FIVE YEAR PLAN FOR MANAGING MIGRATION 
 In 2005, the British government articulated the newest of its policies for 
managing immigration in a report entitled “Controlling our borders: Making migration 
work for Britain.”137 The report outlined a five-year plan for the standardization of the 
British immigration program through a “points-based scheme...to ensure all those settling 
permanently in the UK bring a long term benefit.”138 The proposal has not been affirmed 
by legislation, but it seeks to replace a system of Immigration Rules which has been 
pieced together through over 50 legislative changes since 1994.139 The proposed reforms 
would simplify the mass of Immigration Rules, like the Primary Purpose Rule discussed 
earlier. According to the government, the reforms seek to address three central problems 
with the old legislation: 1) the inconsistency of Immigration Rule application in cases of 
beneficial migrants, 2) “complex, subjective and bureaucratic processes,” and 3) abuse of 
migration policies.140 The new legislation combines a desire on the part of the British 
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government to streamline the immigration process, as well as reduce the number of 
individuals who take advantage of the currently disorganized system. 
In order to meet these goals, the government’s plans outline a new five-tier 
system for managing migration and settlement in the United Kingdom. These tiers are 
supported by a “points” system in which applicants are gauged based on predictions 
about “a migrant’s success in the labour market...and control factors (which relate to 
whether someone is likely to comply with the conditions of their leave).”141 The system 
for evaluation is primarily economic, and seeks to identify fairly those migrants “who 
will increase the skills and knowledge-base of the UK...invest capital or in their 
education,” or otherwise contribute to the British economy.142 Very little reference is 
made to cultural capital, though the report notes that the new system will work to invite 
individuals “who will enrich UK society by their presence and act as ambassadors for the 
UK on their return home.”143 In many ways, Britain’s legislation adequately supports the 
highly-skilled participation of economic citizens, but does little to support their cultural 
and political needs.  
 The five-tier system is broken down into categories of permanent and temporary 
migration. The first two categories deal with permanent migration, and include “highly 
skilled individuals” who can “contribute to growth and productivity in the UK” (Tier 1) 
or “skilled workers with a job offer to fill gaps in the UK labour force” (Tier 2).144 The 
remaining three tiers, in which applicants are assumed to “return home at the end of their 
stay” include “low skilled workers needed to fill specific temporary labour shortages,” 
students, and other temporary workers (Tiers 3, 4, and 5). A system of points, awarded 
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differently from tier to tier, includes criteria ranging from predicted contributions to the 
UK economy to general qualifications and English language ability.145  
 Where permanent migration and settlement is concerned, the initial report of 2005 
outlines three categories of acceptable migrants: “certain skilled workers...genuine 
refugees,” and the immediate families of British citizens.146 The report also notes that 
“Permanent migrants must be as economically active as possible; put as little burden on 
the state as possible; and be as socially integrated as possible.”147 Overall, the collection 
of literature on the most modern migration and immigration legislation seeks to put in 
place a system of regulations that limits migration to economically advantageous 
individuals who can integrate into mainstream British society quickly and easily. The 
definition of “British society” is made unclear by the country’s limited support of its 
large multicultural population.  
 
V.  A HAPHAZARD APPROACH TO A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY 
The efforts to standardize Britain’s immigration legislation are a positive 
development, as they represent an official response to the inconsistencies and prejudices 
supported by the historical Immigration Rules system. As the wider statistics and history 
of immigration illustrate, however, the United Kingdom has become an increasingly 
multicultural polity. Andrew Geddes notes that increasingly restrictive immigration 
legislation from the 1960s to 1980s was balanced by domestic “anti-discrimination 
legislation” in the form of “three ‘race relations’ acts of 1965, 1968, and 1976” designed 
to prevent racial and ethnic discrimination.148 Over the past two decades, however, 
Britain has done little to integrate its multicultural community through legal channels.  
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Bhikhu Parekh, the chair of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic 
Britain, argues that “The very language used to describe and define race relations in 
Britain is a source of considerable conceptual and political muddle.”149 The Race 
Relations Act of 1976 has been added to only through a series of amendments in 2000, 
though the independent Commission led by Parekh argues that “In the longer 
term...amendments are not enough. A new Equality Act is required, together with a new 
Equality Commission.”150 In addition, Parekh’s report calls for a greater commitment to 
Britain’s obligations to human rights, and for the UK to “formally declare itself...a 
multicultural state.”151 In the absence of such organized commitments to its multicultural 
population, however, a variety of legal conflicts arise—one of which will be discussed 
here as a brief example.  
In the United Kingdom, conflicts of cultural norms in law are resolved through an 
unsure reliance on British legal norms. A recent High Court case in 2000, labeled “the 
case of the missing pound,” is one such conflict in which British law finds a way to work 
around the pluralities of Muslim law.152 In the example of this case, Ali v. Ali, the High 
Court judge was asked to enforce conditions of a contract entered into under Muslim law 
between a couple seeking a divorce under English law.153 Under Muslim law, the wife 
would receive £30,001, while under English law she would have received very little 
financial support.154 Rather than apply Muslim law, the High Court judge gave the 
woman £30,000— £1 less—invoking the English law of equity.155 This case is 
particularly interesting as a result of two outcomes. First, the divorced woman is treated 
fairly, while English law remains insulated “from the unrelenting pressure to accept 
personal laws, such as that of the Muslims, as part of the new British legal 
 - 47 - 
framework.”156 The details of the case are less important than the precedent it sets with 
regard to multicultural relations in the United Kingdom.  
This brief relation of Ali v. Ali is rather simplified, but the case as a whole 
represents one of many cases in which resistance against non-English norms seeks to 
avoid the “collective disposition” or “transient pluralities” of cultural difference. A 
homogenous population is theoretically more manageable, particularly where law is 
concerned, as the Ali v. Ali case illustrates. Great Britain fails to realize, however, that 
much of its law could protect minorities and their cultures without destroying itself. Great 
Britain’s primary difficulty may be a lack of standardization, particularly where respect 
for multicultural citizens are concerned. As a result, British legal decisions are 
inconsistent—occasionally they protect cultural rights, but often they do not. In the midst 
of diverse decisions, no strong legal precedent or legislation exists which sets the 
standard for minority and hybrid citizenship in Great Britain.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There is little question that minority communities must shoulder the burden of 
citizenship when they choose to emigrate—this has historically been the case, and there is 
little chance of the norm drastically changing in the future. Nonetheless, the pressures 
that have influenced such dramatic changes in Great Britain’s legislation illustrate the 
challenges of managing a growing multicultural population. In the same moment, a 
review of Great Britain’s immigration and integration methods shows imperfect 
protections for hybrid communities seeking to understand the value and dynamic 
potential of citizenship over a longer history. If Great Britain is committed to truly 
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democratic processes and the protection of its citizens’ interests, cosmopolitan citizens 
cannot be excluded. Great Britain continues to have several ways forward in its efforts to 
negotiate its own “melting pot” and globalized society. 
I argue that the British ‘phenomenon’ of a multi-ethnic society could potentially 
be evaluated through three lenses. First, it can be interpreted through the narrow lens of 
Hobbesian state sovereignty, in which a series of strict immigration policies illustrate an 
expectation of assimilation on the part of multicultural communities. This perspective 
often creates animosity among globalized citizens who are making significant efforts to 
integrate into a new community. Second, it can be analyzed from the equally strict 
perspective of pluralism. From this perspective, Great Britain’s attempts at controlling 
migration and its failure to adopt a diversity of legal and cultural structures limit 
successful integration and pluralism. Furthermore, pluralism is a difficult philosophy to 
live out in reality—particularly when cultural differences emerge so clearly at the ends of 
fundamentalist spectrums. Neither the assimilationist nor the pluralist perspective seems 
successful in balancing a multi-ethnic democracy in which the burden of citizenship and 
statehood is shared across cultural boundaries. 
A third perspective is perhaps best defined through the lens of globalization—
which keeps both state sovereignty and global interdependence in view. Through this 
third perspective, it is possible to see British immigration legislation in a period of 
transition as it navigates the new challenges of democracy in an age of globalization. 
Keeping the reality of the British example in mind, it seems that the last lens is 
the most useful. Much of the theoretical literature on models for pluralism has focused on 
a world beyond sovereignty in which borders should not or do not exist, while little has 
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been written as a way to bridge the gap between the old world of states and the new 
unknown. A lens of globalization allows for analysis which recognizes the strength of 
state borders, but also the increasing potency of multicultural communities. Under the 
criteria of the last lens, the British immigration legislation still falls far short of ideal 
under conditions of globalization. It seeks to maintain its territorial sovereignty, but 
defines an unmanageable integration rhetoric in the process. Under the interdependence 
conditions of globalization, states must include multicultural societies within the 
legislative umbrellas of their sovereign social contract.  
Building strong economic citizens is not enough to maintain the democratic 
process, as the new Five Year Plan attempts to do. Multi-ethnic citizens must understand 
the value of the democratic process, and have consistent access to the protections it 
provides. Without significant legislative changes to support cultural diversity within its 
borders, Britain can never hope to democratically navigate a world of globalization which 
thrives on interdependence and diversity. At the same time, minority citizens must 
continue to do the difficult work of searching for their own identity in a globalized world. 
They can bring a wealth of new cultural practices to the British population, but they also 
must work to preserve a political and social environment where such diversity can be 
respected in the long-term.  
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CHAPTER 4  
CASE STUDY REVIEW: CHALLENGES OF LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE NETHERLANDS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 The Netherlands has historically been recognized as highly accommodating and 
supportive of its minority communities. Dutch immigration policies were relatively 
liberal, until recent changes transformed the nation from a European model to a more 
characteristic ‘muddle.’ The earliest stages of Dutch pluralism show a unique legal 
respect for pluralism and multiculturalism, and Dutch tolerance of immigrant cultures 
made it an ideal host country for asylum seekers and economic migrants. Dutch policies 
today are widely divergent from their counterparts two decades ago. The Dutch approach 
has changed significantly as a result of economic instability, worries about national 
security, and a diversifying national community. Despite these changes, Dutch 
immigration and integration legislation is an essential guide for minorities as they 
navigate the legal processes of citizenship and ‘belonging’ in a democratic state. Dutch 
policies also represent a first introduction to democratic life, particularly for asylum 
seekers and immigrants who arrive from failed or undemocratic states.  
 This chapter presents three central topics in an analysis of Dutch immigration and 
integration legislation. The first section outlines the history of migration and 
multiculturalism in the Netherlands. Migration is not a new phenomenon for the country, 
nor is the growth of minority communities, and a historical backdrop provides 
perspectives for the remainder of the chapter. The second section reviews the broad 
changes in legislation that currently impact ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. A third 
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section will discuss the most recent developments in legislation and integration and the 
challenges that they present for supporting strong democratic citizens among ethnic 
minority communities.  
 
II. HISTORY OF MULTICULTURALISM IN THE NETHERLANDS 
According to authors Jan Lucassen and Rinus Penninx, waves of immigration and 
emigration in the Netherlands have existed for over four centuries.157 Though the 
discourse and political rhetoric about these ‘newcomers’ has changed over time, the 
challenges remain the same. Despite the long history of immigration in the Netherlands, 
this chapter is concerned specifically with the more modern realities of newcomers in the 
period following the Second World War.  
 Following the end of World War II, three categories of migration can be identified 
in the history of the Netherlands—those migrating for political reasons, as a result of 
economic factors, or as asylum seekers.158 First, the Netherlands saw an increase in 
political migration that began as a result of independence movements in its colonial 
territories. The first important group of migrants was from the Dutch colony in Indonesia. 
Lucassen and Penninx estimate that from 1945 to 1965, around 300,000 migrants traveled 
from Indonesia to settle in the Netherlands.159 Following Japan’s occupation of Indonesia 
between 1942 and 1945, around 120,000 Dutch nationals escaped political persecution 
and instability in order to return en masse to the Netherlands.160  
In addition, these hundreds of thousands of native Dutch were joined by around 
180,000 mixed Dutch-Indonesians—who were born to at least one Dutch parent, and who 
chose Dutch nationality over Indonesian nationality.161 Finally, the migration of a third 
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group of Moluccans resulted from political instability in Indonesia in the late 1940s. 
Originally, the Moluccans served in the Netherlands Indies Army and opposed the 
Indonesian government’s rule in an effort to gain Moluccan independence.162 The 
Indonesian government refused to negotiate with the Moluccans, and the Netherlands 
government eventually agreed to allow the temporary migration of 12,500 Moluccans to 
the Netherlands.163 Initially, the Moluccans were housed in camps in the Netherlands, 
forbidden to work, and were completely isolated from the larger Dutch society.164 
Beginning in the 1950s, the Moluccan community numbered around 32,000, and they 
were increasingly granted work opportunities and relocated to Dutch towns.165 Despite 
these attempts at integration, a Moluccan terrorist group comprised of second generation 
Moluccan immigrants carried out a series of attacks on Dutch soil between 1975 and 
1978.166 In 1977, attacks on a Dutch train and terrorist occupation of a school led to a 
forceful reaction on the part of the Dutch government to free hostages.167 Following these 
attacks in 1977, Moluccan terrorism ceased, and a more successfully integrated 
community of Moluccans and their descendants numbers around 40,000.168  
Moluccans were joined by large numbers of Surinamese between 1973 and 1975, 
when the approaching independence of Surinam threatened to bring an end to the 
substantial benefits of Dutch citizenship for the Surinamese.169 Though the Charter for 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 1954 allowed the free movement of Surinamese 
citizens, the expiration of this provision meant that thousands of Surinamese sought to 
take advantage of their ‘last chance’ at the full rights associated with official Dutch 
citizenship. In 1975 alone, the Netherlands saw almost 40,000 Surinamese cross the 
Dutch border, bringing the population of Surinamese in the Netherlands to just over 
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100,000.170 In the end, almost a third of the Surinamese population immigrated to the 
Netherlands.171 Today, provisional data for the year 2007 estimates that over 300,000 
individuals of Surinamese origin or second generation descent currently reside in the 
Netherlands.172  
Migration through colonial channels was extremely valuable for individuals 
holding Dutch passports. The second major reason for immigration to the Netherlands 
was economic. For colonial and non-colonial subjects, economic incentives encouraged 
many migrants to leave their homes in search of better opportunities. Migrants were 
given opportunities through government guest worker programs in the 1960s, and later by 
more modern permanent economic migration.173 The first workers were recruited from 
Spain and Italy, though a larger percentage arrived from Turkey, Morocco, and Tunisia 
during the mid-1960s. Like many other countries in Western Europe, the Dutch 
government believed that these ‘guest’ workers would be resident in the Netherlands for 
the short term only, and the migrants initially acted under similar sentiments.  
Like other European countries at the time, the Netherlands ended its guest worker 
programs in 1974, following the 1973 oil crisis, massive economic restructuring, and a 
decrease in the need for foreign labor.174 Economic migration continues today, though it 
is limited and accepted applicants are generally highly skilled. The complex economic 
changes during the 1970s significantly transformed the demographic composition of the 
minority presence in the Netherlands.175 Many of the European migrant workers recruited 
during the 1960s returned to their own homes as Dutch labor opportunities declined and 
their own countries improved. In contrast, large numbers of Turks and Moroccans stayed 
and invited their families to the Netherlands.176 New family arrangements also became 
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common in the 1990s, as it became more difficult to gain entry clearance for other 
reasons. Lucassen and Penninx write that by 1992 “the Turks and Moroccans constituted 
the largest groups of immigrants in the Netherlands (250,000 and 195,000 respectively) 
after the Surinamese.”177 Today, the Turkish community in the Netherlands exceeds 
360,000 if second generation Turkish are included.178   
Migration had existed for decades, but the Netherlands began to realize quickly in 
the 1970s that the ‘guest’ worker population was determined to stay. Great Britain and 
the Netherlands are similar in this respect. Many of the “guests” became permanent 
citizens, but few legislative efforts capitalized on their permanent contributions to 
democratic society. Workers also invited their families to the Netherlands, rather than 
risk losing their residence status by returning to their homes abroad. The ethnic minority 
communities were imperfectly embraced in a democratic system that had never truly 
‘welcomed’ diversity. When guest worker programs ended, ethnic minority communities 
grew without a clear sense of their legal or cultural responsibilities to the democratic 
polities they had entered. Legislators, too, were unsure of how to respond to their new 
constituents.  
In addition to political and economic migrants, large scale asylum applications to 
the Netherlands began in 1974 following the end of official guest worker programs. 
Rising trends in asylum applications began in the 1980s, with a record number of over 
52,000 in 1994 alone.179 Applications have decreased dramatically since 1994, though 
they increased between 2004 and 2005, when 12,350 applications for asylum were 
received.180 Large populations of asylum migrants can impact ethnic minority and host 
country populations in several ways. First, asylum seekers largely arrive from failed 
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states or undemocratic states, or as a result of some other threat to human rights. This 
reality could potentially encourage their appreciation of democratic systems, though it 
complicates their understanding of such processes. Second, asylum seekers also pose a 
complicated dilemma where economic value to society is concerned. Asylum seekers 
who are later given citizenship or long-term residency rarely have the means to contribute 
significantly to national economies. Their value to society must be recalculated using 
international standards of human rights, rather than the more economically based criteria 
used for immigration as a whole. Finally, asylum seekers (or new migrants more 
generally) retain cultural specificities that can clash with local cultures, whether Dutch or 
hybrid. Some asylum seekers may feel alienated and ostracized by the Dutch population, 
and turn instead to enclaves of their national origin. The historical backgrounds of 
minority communities have changed over time, however, and more ‘hybrid’ cultures 
mean that even their national culture feels different. 
In conclusion, the modern history of migration in the Netherlands is both dynamic 
and multi-faceted. One modern report suggests that communities of non-Western 
immigrants in the Netherlands are as large as 1.6 million, or ten percent of the country’s 
population.181 According to the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, first and second 
generation individuals with at least one parent born abroad make up 19.4% of the 
population in the Netherlands.182 Each generation of migrants cites a unique memoir of 
immigration experiences and the legislation surrounding these experiences. The climate 
of immigration in the Netherlands may be changing yet again—influenced by the social 
tension that has increased following the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 
November 2004.183 Restrictive immigration and asylum policies, and continuing debates 
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over family reunion and the social integration of minority groups suggest that the history 
of migration in the Netherlands is far from complete. Like the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands seeks to preserve its institutions and societal values—immigration and 
integration legislation are a central method for doing so. 
 
III. LEGAL OBSTACLES 
The challenges of migration and the growth of multicultural communities in the 
Netherlands parallel a changing legal regime of immigration, integration, and asylum 
policies. Despite innovative commitments to more inclusive and respectful “minorities 
policy” during the 1970s, modern immigration and integration policies have moved away 
from a focus on multiculturalism toward a focus on civic integration, or inburgering.184 
From the 1970s until today, two competing approaches have pursued divergent legal and 
political solutions to the challenges of a multicultural Dutch society. Several important 
legal developments will be discussed in this section.  
The first approach of “minorities policy,” prevalent between the 1970s and early 
1980s, was the product of pillarization, or verzuiling, which defined a political system of 
“institutionalised separateness” for Dutch religious and cultural communities.185 The 
recognition of separate pillars largely disappeared in the 1960s, but policies directly 
affecting minority groups were influenced by the “identity-affirming” qualities of 
pillarization even after the official decline of the policy.186 The Dutch pillarization policy 
was recognized across Europe as a highly liberal and innovative one, and while its 
effectiveness was limited, it did seek equality and freedom for many of the varied ethnic 
groups in the Netherlands. The transformation from pillarization to civic integration was 
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based on the recognition that many minority communities were becoming too separate 
from the mainstream Dutch community, and the legislation today reflects significant 
changes in mindset and expectation. 
 
1983 Minorities Policy 
Perhaps the most influential legal development reflecting the affirming approach 
of this early period was the 1983 Minorities Policy. According to Andrew Geddes, this 
policy “saw the Netherlands as a multi-ethnic society with the expression of ethnic 
differences by immigrants an important part of their social identity, which should be 
protected.”187 The policy contained three central goals which advocated the promotion of 
minority equality before law, the promotion of “multiculturalism and the emancipation of 
ethnic communities,” and improvements in the social and economic realities of 
minorities.188  
Combining legal equality with equal opportunities, the 1983 Minorities Policy 
embraced a method for integration that did not require a renunciation of unique cultural 
identities.189 More importantly, Dutch policies offered cultural “pillars” a clear avenue 
for political participation. Dutch policies granting voting rights to residents of third 
country national status after five years of legal residence make the Netherlands, to this 
day, one of the few states to grant limited political participation rights to non-nationals.190 
Despite concerted attempts to encourage a pluralistic minorities policy, political changes 
and historical evolutions slowly began to erode the ambitious steps toward multicultural 
integration taken during the 1970s and 1980s. 
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Post-1983 Legislation  
It is difficult to pinpoint a single year or event between the 1980s and today which 
marks the official decline of the plural minorities policy, though several trends greatly 
influenced the rising popularity of less multicultural integration policies. First, political 
and academic statistics in the late 1980s began to reflect a growing gap of inequality and 
marginalization between native Dutch and minority communities.191 As a result, political 
sentiments shifted, and multiculturalism was challenged by individuals seeking to 
encourage a universal commitment to “the Dutch way of life.”192 This new commitment 
is illustrated most recently by the introduction of the 2006 Integration Abroad Act, and 
the 2007 New Integration Act. While the 1983 Minorities Policy “explicitly safe-
guarded” the cultural autonomy of minorities and rejected forced assimilation, modern 
policies focus on civic integration through inburgering, or integration through adaptation 
and assimilation.193  
Among other conditions, the New Integration Act and the Integration Abroad Act 
places an obligation on individuals applying for residence status in the Netherlands to 
achieve integration through an “integration programme…consisting of courses in Dutch 
and social and vocational orientation, career planning, social guidance.”194 The New 
Integration Act and the Integration Abroad Act follow legislation made with the 1998 
Law on the Civic Integration of Newcomers, which requires “500 hours of language 
training and 100 hours of civic education” in order to meet integration requirements.195 
The requirements might potentially be useful in educating better citizens in a dynamic 
democracy, but they are used instead to define the parameters of Dutch identity. 
Minorities who participate in local and national politics have become disenchanted not 
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because laws to protect them do not exist, but because they are not enforced. Jytte 
Klausen writes that “Dutch Muslim leaders were particularly skeptical that more laws 
would resolve anything. ‘We already have so many laws,’ several people said, ‘and none 
of them are enforced.’”196 Two types of skepticism seem to exist where minority 
legislation is concerned. First, many minorities do not understand the value of the 
democratic process and blindly dismiss it. Second, those minorities who are deeply 
invested in the democratic process have become frustrated with the difficulty of 
supporting diverse communities and enforcing legislation.  
 The increasing size, diversity, and economic status of ethnic minority and 
immigrant communities also challenged Dutch policy makers at the turn of the century.197 
Several legislative changes beginning in 1984 attempted to calm the growing public 
excitement over the evolving identity of Dutch minority communities. First, the 
Nationality Act of 1984 presented significant challenges to newcomers seeking 
naturalization. The 1984 Act followed an attempt by right-wing politicians to reduce 
minority naturalization through the adoption of a bill which would have excluded 
Surinamese immigrants from a “rapid naturalisation procedure…for persons who had lost 
their Dutch nationality.”198 While the 1984 Act was not so openly xenophobic, two 
modifications “were clearly related to the desire to restrict immigration.”199 The Act 
abolished the option for non-Dutch women to choose Dutch nationality after marriage to 
a Dutch citizen.200 As Groenendijk and Heijs note, this change had the effect of reducing 
the number of marriages whose primary purpose was to acquire Dutch nationality—much 
like the British Primary Purpose Rule.  
 - 60 - 
A second provision granting stateless children born in the Netherlands Dutch 
nationality was also removed—introducing a three-year residence requirement which 
would have the effect of preventing children born to stateless parents from acquiring 
Dutch citizenship.201 This same rule was used to prevent stateless children’s parents from 
acquiring residence status and eventual citizenship. Overall, the shift in approaches to 
migration has been significant, and political and legal debates are far from over.   
 
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FOCUS: ASYLUM AND INTEGRATION 
 Two significant areas of modern legislative change currently impact minority 
communities in the Netherlands. First, new asylum legislation has redefined the Dutch 
perspective on immigration between 2000 and today. Second, a new integration model 
has changed naturalization requirements and perceptions of Dutch identity and 
democracy. Both the asylum and integration legislation help define normal or 
‘acceptable’ Dutch standards for entry clearance. A more critical look at this legislation 
suggests that it serves more than a “gate keeping” function. Though this is certainly part 
of the equation, asylum and integration legislation serves as the ‘instruction manual’ for 
Dutch democracy in migrant communities.   
 
Modern Asylum Developments  
Within this decade, the Dutch government overhauled its asylum and aliens 
policies with the Aliens Act 2000. Vera Marinelli writes “The introduction of a tougher 
asylum law in April 2001 led to a dramatic drop in applications. In 2004, less than 
10,000 people applied for asylum in the Netherlands, a 30 per cent drop from 2003. 
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This signified the lowest number of asylum applications since 1988.”202 The Act was 
initially a highly effective legislative tool for closing the Netherlands’ doors. As the 
government soon realized, however, the legislation would not stand without 
complications. Under the old legislation, thousands of asylum seekers had waited over 
five years in the Netherlands for their asylum decisions or appeals.203 The Netherlands 
became a safe haven and home for many asylum seekers, though the new legislation 
threatened to disrupt their legal remedies. Around 26,000 of these asylum seekers faced 
deportation before their appeals were completed.204 The harsh impact of the legislation 
did not go unnoticed among the Dutch public or the international community.  
 Two significant civil society responses to the Dutch legislation appeared 
following the decision to deport the 26,000 asylum seekers. First, Dutch filmmakers and 
NGOs rallied together in a project called 26,000 gezichten, or ‘26,000 faces.’ Marinelli 
suggests that the widely aired and publicized media project was “designed to give a face 
to the 26,000 asylum seekers” who were denied rights under new Dutch legislation.205 
The project’s website argues that 8,000 is a more accurate and reasonable number of 
asylum seekers facing deportation, and adds that the children of these migrants have 
integrated successfully—speaking Dutch and maintaining a hybrid of their home 
cultures.206 The website is not available entirely in English, though many of the videos 
are subtitled from the original Dutch language. The videos available are an excellent 
visual display of minority attempts to integrate into society. Additionally, the collection 
of small clips seeks to illustrate the human and legal injustice of the threatened 
deportations. The profiles are a reminder of the myriad assets that asylum seekers and 
minorities bring to a country like the Netherlands.  
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 A second civil society response to Dutch legislation—this time international—
arrived in 2003 when Human Rights Watch published an extensive report claiming that 
Dutch law violated “fundamental asylum and refugee rights” under international law. 
When the bill to deport thousands of asylum seekers was approved by a large portion of 
Dutch legislators, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees also “expressed 
concern” with the Dutch law.207 Following changes in government over several years and 
pressure from the United Nations and European Union, the Netherlands amended its 
legislation. The asylum Act still remains strict, though revisions have softened the initial 
blow. The most recent provision resolved the issue of deportation for the “26,000” 
asylum seekers caught between two Acts. In June 2007, a general amnesty was approved 
for all asylum seekers whose applications were submitted before April 2001, and who 
maintained residence and good legal standing.208 
 The most recent legal developments in asylum legislation in the Netherlands are 
promising—particularly if asylum seekers take advantage opportunities for continued 
residence. Nonetheless, the naturalization and immigration process remains difficult to 
navigate. The Dutch legal handbook of citizenship offers asylum seekers and new 
immigrants few guidelines for making the Netherlands “home.” 
 
The New Integration Policies 
 In 2006, the Dutch government introduced requirements for a civic integration 
examination to be completed by all individuals seeking long-term settlement or family 
reunion.209 Asylum seekers and residents in the Netherlands are required to take a similar 
integration exam if they wish to acquire citizenship. The newest legislation requires that 
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certain newcomers complete this examination before they arrive in the Netherlands. In 
their informational brochure, the government also notes that “Religious leaders coming to 
the Netherlands for employment, such as imams or preachers, will also have to take the 
civic integration examination abroad.” 210  
European Union citizens, American citizens, Japanese citizens, and a handful of 
other non-European states are exempt from the exam, though they are still required to 
apply for residence permits. The exam requires that migrants display “basic knowledge of 
both the Dutch language and Dutch society before they come to the Netherlands.”211 
Migrants who are required to complete the exam must do so at a Dutch embassy after 
preparing adequately. The exam costs 350euros (approximately $500US), and 
preparation materials can be acquired for another 70euros (approximately $100US).212 
According to the government brochure, the exam (given only in Dutch) consists of two 
parts: a language section, and a society portion, which each last 15 minutes.213 Topics and 
questions vary widely, despite the short nature of the exam.  
The society portion of the exam is the most diverse. The brochure reveals that 
questions can be asked about: “The Netherlands: living here, geography, and 
transport...history...constitution, democracy, and legislation...the Dutch language and the 
importance of learning it...parenting and education...health care...work and income.”214 
For migrants taking the exam at an embassy abroad, the subject list is no doubt daunting. 
Any of these subjects can take a lifetime to learn in their entirety, yet successful 
completion of the exam is required for a residence lasting more than three months. The 
Netherlands has the opportunity to build a generation of active and well-informed 
multicultural citizens through its legislation. The increasing restrictions and heightened 
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requirements seem to suggest that citizenship denotes acceptance into an unchanging 
national community. Migrants are required to familiarize themselves with Dutch identity, 
but the Dutch population remains largely uninformed about the large minority 
populations who also identify themselves as “Dutch.” Furthermore, migrant communities 
are expected to conform to Dutch standards of culture and society, rather than to more 
universal standards of democratic life, human rights, and state law.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Several conclusions can be drawn from a review of the Dutch immigration and 
integration legislation. First, much like the example in Great Britain, the Netherlands 
must find a balance between maintaining its sovereignty, its democracy, and its search for 
‘homogenous’ identity. Globalization (and history) has made a truly uniform national 
identity close to impossible. The creation of social integration exams, however, suggests 
that the Dutch government is not yet ready to abandon its project of uniformity, and has 
tied a relatively uniform identity with the rights of citizenship and residence. 
 Second, modern legislation grows a generation of minority immigrants who are 
both uninformed about democratic processes and disenchanted with the Dutch majority 
government. Minorities who could be an asset to the Dutch population instead become a 
burden, even if only in the imaginations of majority populations or legislators.  
 Third, the Netherlands has a long history of supporting diversity. Reaching to the 
core of its democratic traditions and core values may aid in a more protective 
environment for minorities. In an era of globalization, it is not enough to teach 
generations of future “Dutchmen” and “Dutchwomen.” The Netherlands has a larger 
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responsibility to protect its democratic values and build generations of multicultural 
citizens who are invested in the maintenance of democratic institutions.  
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CHAPTER 5 
SEARCHING FOR E PLURIBUS UNUM: DEMOCRACY, CITIZENSHIP, AND 
CONSTITUTIONALITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Aristotle writes in Politics that “If we hold...that liberty is chiefly to be found in 
democracy and that the same goes for equality, this condition is most fully realized when 
all share, as far as possible, on the same terms in the constitution.”215 He goes on to say 
that this constitutional order “is bound to be a democracy; for the people are the majority, 
and the decision of the majority is sovereign.”216 Though the composition of the “people” 
representing constitutional democracies worldwide varies greatly over the centuries, the 
notion of democracy itself remains only subtly changed. Even so, the most recent 
developments in European governance herald delicate transformations that challenge and 
envision a new form of democratic life, particularly where minorities are concerned. The 
majority still remains sovereign, but the European Union has yet to envision an official 
constitution—relying instead on state institutions to provide for the constitutional rights 
of European citizens. Case studies from Great Britain and the Netherlands illustrate two 
vital tasks for the modern democratic state: 1) refining democratic immigration and 
integration legislation, and 2) defining such legislation in a way that maintains 
democratic institutions and encourages the contributions of multicultural citizens.  
The struggle to define a diverse European democracy is not limited to member 
states alone. A general regime of liberty, democracy, and equality exists within each of 
the European Union member states, though the larger European polity is inherently 
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limited by the failure of all states to share the burden and responsibility of upholding a 
common constitution. Aristotle’s prescriptions still hold true. Liberty and democracy at 
the EU level are only partially realized without the backbone of a constitutional polity. 
The rejection of a European Union constitution is a particularly instructive example of 
both the possibilities and challenges that are embodied by the Union’s redefinition of 
global and regional democratic life. A democratic Constitution and a strong judicial pillar 
in the EU could redefine the struggle for belonging among British and Dutch citizens, as 
well as in other member states. For minorities, direct involvement in the creation of a 
multicultural democratic polity would offer a sense of identity and democratic investment 
as well.  
This chapter explores three dimensions of the European Union as an emerging 
democratic polity with astounding diversity. First, I will explore the historical growth of 
the Union, in order to understand its patterns of interdependent development. Second, I 
will discuss in more detail the growth of European Union citizenship alongside the failure 
of constitutional referendums. I will conclude the chapter by arguing that the success of 
the European “democratic project” will rely on the creation of a judicial pillar of 
interdependence. The lack of a well defined pillar for EU judicial participation is similar 
to the more local problems minorities face at the state level. While state legislation and 
other obstacles make it difficult for minorities to become invested in democratic 
institutions, the Union’s “democratic deficit” is an obstacle for all citizens. This deficit 
must be resolved in order for true citizenship to be possible for all Europeans. 
Additionally, models for resolving this deficit offer insight into resolving the problem of 
difference within the member-states themselves.  
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II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN UNION INTERDEPENDENCE 
Economic Roots 
Following World War II, it is doubtful that the French or German governments 
had any knowledge that their European Coal and Steel Community would grow to 
become one of the most unique global superpowers. Perhaps they did not guess even a 
few years later, when the European Economic Community (EC) solidified economic 
relations between a diverse group of member states. Fifty years after its creation, the EC 
is not unrecognizable within its current manifestation as the European Union (EU), but it 
has continued to grow in breadth and depth as the decades have passed. At present, the 
growth of the European Union is arguably one of the most important developments in 
global affairs as a result of both its successes and shortcomings.  
In order to understand the European Union as it exists today, it is helpful to 
understand the historical changes that have built the political and institutional foundations 
of the EU. As was mentioned above, European cooperation began with the European 
Coal and Steel Community in 1952. Though initial French concern about increasing 
German economic competition after WWII was the first impetus to this union, Belgium, 
The Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Germany, and Italy were the first collaborative 
members of the Community.217 The creation of a more official European Economic 
Community in 1957 encouraged the elimination of tariffs between member nations and 
began to institutionalize the already prevalent intra-European trading and integration 
networks available within the borders of its member states.218 The Maastricht Treaty in 
1992 was a watershed moment for the EU as it is known today. While the plans outlined 
in Maastricht retained the strong economic integration seen in previous agreements, they 
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also allowed for the creation of a common foreign and security policy, as well as 
increased cooperation in justice and home affairs.219 The Union continues to grow as it 
brings new and more diverse member states into the legal and economic community.  
 
Interdependence and Political Cooperation 
The European Union is most important not only for its vast economic 
cooperation, but also for the way this cooperation has occurred. The European Union as a 
polity represents the first tangible example of such complex interdependence and 
cooperation, though the project is incomplete. Political scientists Keohane and Nye and 
others have offered detailed academic theories of complex interdependence, and these 
theories are particularly applicable in an era of globalization.220 Mark Leonard uses 
similar theories to analyze political developments in the European Union.  
 Mark Leonard’s text Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century is a daring text that 
contains a vital lesson for any country aspiring to a role of global leadership. He 
describes an integrated Europe that has the potential to challenge the world’s current 
superpowers with a new form of governance and democracy that brings the whole of 
Europe closer to a cooperative peace. He sees progress toward a European constitution as 
a process which enshrines “the principles of ‘Network Europe,’ which is now free to 
carry on its unique experiment of reinventing democracy for an age of globalization.”221  
 Leonard’s most important contribution to the literature on the European Union is 
his realization that the EU is beginning to redefine democratic governance in the current 
century. Two EU developments are particularly instructive. First, Leonard notes that 
successful international cooperation is contingent not on the use of force, but on a 
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relationship of co-optation which allows countries “to uphold the rules themselves, rather 
than coercing them into submission.”222 This creates a system of cooperation and 
collaboration between nations rather than relying on a single superpower to enforce 
submission at a global level. The second redefinition of governance embodied by the 
institutions of the EU is recognizes the value of “perpetual peace.”223 A concept first 
delineated by Immanuel Kant, perpetual peace is representative of a “brotherhood of 
republics” which has peaceful relations as a result of focused and intentional 
cooperation.224 As Leonard writes, European nations have consciously worked toward 
this perpetual peace following the catastrophes of two World Wars.225 Through 
cooperation, negotiation, and a network of collaborative peace, European nations have 
been able to secure a unique interdependent polity. 
Overall, Leonard identifies European integration as a potential model for global 
regionalism that promotes “global development, regional security, and open markets.”226 
Leonard argues that a “domino effect” of regional integration modeled after the EU will 
“change our ideas of politics, economics and redefine what power means for the twenty-
first century.”227 On a larger scale, Leonard goes so far as to suggest that the EU model of 
integration could be a possible step in the direction of a world order characterized by 
“perpetual peace.”228 He explores the potential benefits of a world where global affairs 
are dominated by integration and a “constructive international order of peace”229 rather 
than unipolarity and warfare.  
 In order to support his thesis, Leonard first explores the changing nature of power 
and global affairs. He writes that “by coming together and pooling their sovereignty to 
achieve common goals, the countries of the European Union have created a new power 
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out of nothing.”230 This power, identified as “transformative power” by Leonard, is not 
defined by military capabilities, nor is it concerned with the short-term goals of 
warfare.231 Rather, Leonard suggests that Europe’s transformative power gives 
precedence to the long-term goal of “reshaping the world.”232 The rise of this non-
military power is a direct result of the realization that one-sided displays of hard power 
are no longer an effective way of ensuring that the interests of states are met in the 
modern world. As Leonard notes, “The lonely superpower can bribe, bully, or impose its 
will almost anywhere in the world, but when its back is turned, its potency wanes.”233 A 
similar thesis might prove supportable in cases where cultural interdependence is 
desirable in diverse member-states. 
In response to this changing global reality, Leonard identifies that European 
integration has spurred a new trend of transformative power and a new “European way of 
war.”234 This transformative power means that co-optation rather than coercion is used as 
the most important method for gaining consent from other states.235 Though the use of 
force as an end in itself has been the traditional norm of the Westphalian state system, the 
use of direct force in the current era is increasingly met with resistance and resentment.236 
In contrast to the use of force in a state-centric system, the strength of transformative 
power in the regional system of the European Union is primarily a result of the EU’s 
“ability to reward reformers and withhold benefits from laggards.”237 Rather than 
resorting to open hostilities with each other, EU member-states agree on a common set of 
goals and values that are internalized and buttressed by the member-states themselves.238 
Because European institutions operate with an “invisible hand” that allows legislation to 
grow out of national interests, individual member states have a vested interest in 
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supporting regional integration.239 In contrast to the relatively peaceful relations between 
European states, Leonard also suggests that the “European way of war” includes the use 
of force in order to build peace and “defend Europe’s value” through the form of 
humanitarian intervention.240 
Despite Leonard’s faith in European progress, the democratic process is far from 
complete. A closer look at processes of citizenship and constitutionalism in the European 
Union reveals unsolved problems—the integration of minorities is only one of many 
related to citizenship and democratic life. European Union economic and security 
interdependence, despite its potential, lacks a complete democratic interdependence. The 
next section will suggest that European citizenship without a Constitution or legal pillar 
may prevent such interdependence. 
 
III. THE UNFINISHED PROJECT OF CITIZENSHIP AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE EU 
Citizenship and Democracy 
European Union citizenship was officially established with the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Amsterdam.241 Though legal European Union 
citizenship exists through commonly accepted treaties, this citizenship is complicated by 
member-state nationality requirements and immigration statutes. European Union 
citizenship is the product of member states, rather than an autonomous creation. Thus, 
European Union citizenship can only be conferred through the member-states, and is not 
entirely standardized from member-state to member-state. The lack of standardization 
and enforcement power in the area of judicial cooperation leaves many citizens turning to 
their member-states for participation in democratic life.  
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EU citizens have many privileges, but are relatively removed from the 
governmental processes at the heart of EU governance. In addition to individual citizens’ 
worries about representation, smaller member-states find it difficult to surrender their 
sovereignty to a governmental body that does not fully recognize their opinions. Philippe 
Schmitter writes that the EU, while not plagued by a democratic crisis, is challenged by 
general symptoms of democratic morbidity and disenchantment within the EU citizenry, 
as well as by an increasing awareness of undemocratic representation.242 The rejection of 
the EU Constitution is the most vivid example of this discontent. While the European 
Union continues to redefine democracy even now, the EU specialties in “trade 
liberalization, monetary policy, the removal of non-tariff barriers, technical 
regulation...foreign aid, and general foreign policy co-ordination” are of little interest to 
the average European citizen.243 As Leonard writes, “none of the policies in the five most 
important issues for voters in Europe – health care provision, education, law and order, 
pension and social security policy, and taxation – are set by the European Union.”244 
Asking citizens to approve a dense constitution like that of the EU, then, was perhaps a 
premature effort. 
 
The Rejection of a Constitution 
In 2002, under the guidance of the former French President Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing, a group of 105 EU representatives gathered at a European Convention in order 
to revise previous Union treaties.245 After over a year of debate and discussion, the 
convention unanimously approved a draft Constitution for the EU which was 
subsequently reviewed and approved in June of 2004 by an Intergovernmental 
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Conference of the member states’ heads of government.246 Finally, a few months later, on 
October 29, 2004, the European constitution was officially signed by member state 
governments at a conference in Rome.247 The signatures marked a crucial moment in the 
history of European Union development, but the permanent success of the European 
constitution also relied upon its affirmative ratification through democratic process in the 
individual member states. Whether the moment of ratification is reached through 
parliamentary approval or popular referendum, the constitution can only be brought into 
force when it is approved and ratified by all of the EU member states.248 In a recent wave 
of popular disapproval, however, both Dutch and French citizens rejected the proposed 
European constitution, thereby halting government ratification of the document.249  
Popular responses to European integration have been relatively unpredictable over 
the past decade, but the “impressive display...of popular dissatisfaction” embodied by the 
Dutch and French rejections have led to claims that “the EU is increasingly paying the 
price...for integrating at the administrative level without offering the public a clear vision 
of integration and its benefits.”250 The span of only a few days between France’s rejection 
of the constitution on May 29, 2005, and the Netherlands’ rejection on June 1st was a 
surprise to many European Union and state political leaders.251 The historical role of both 
France and the Netherlands at the heart of European Union expansion makes the two 
rejections all the more shocking. BBC World Affairs correspondent Paul Reynolds writes 
in an editorial following the French rejection that “This is not like Britain saying "No". 
That would be a problem. This is a crisis. It means that something is rotten in the state of 
Europe.”252 
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The Dutch rejection only days after the French’s rejection simply added salt to an 
open wound. As Dutch scholar Ben Crum notes, “The Netherlands is traditionally 
counted among the EU member states most dedicated to the integration project.”253 To 
have the Dutch populace dismiss the carefully articulated European constitution by a 
staggering 60 percent “left the European elite reeling and facing the prospect of a 
protracted period of recrimination, conflict and crisis.”254 The two rejections raise larger 
questions about the future of European integration, and British foreign secretary Jack 
Straw suggested following the referendums that the negative reactions raise “profound 
questions for all of us about the future direction of Europe.”255 French President Jacques 
Chirac and German chancellor Gerhard Schröder echoed these sentiments.256 A right-
wing Dutch politician suggested following the failed referendum that problems in the 
Netherlands are to blame, though others blame larger European problems.257 Although 
the possibility of an EU constitution was not destroyed by the recent referendums, the 
deeper issues prompting their rejection must be dealt with before long-term unity can be 
achieved. The variety of unconquered European obstacles contributing to the negatively 
received referendums will be discussed in the next section of the paper. 
A variety of unresolved problems lie beneath the surface of European integration. 
The failed referendums in France and the Netherlands are indicative of the growing 
importance of these issues, though the referendums fortunately do not bring about a true 
reversal of integration. Regardless, the negative reactions prompt a strong need for 
European self-evaluation and reformation at the level of the political elite. In a general 
sense, the referendums illustrate a growing discontent with the gap between individual 
European citizens and their representatives at the European level. As Paul Reynolds 
 - 76 - 
writes, “The institutions of the EU have got ahead of the peoples of the EU.”258 Overall, 
citizens are wary of relinquishing their hold on the security provided by states. The 
problem is only exacerbated by the fact that citizens increasingly feel alienated by both 
their state governments and EU institutions alike. 
The Guardian Unlimited reports that “Growing anti-Muslim sentiment, 
opposition to EU membership for Turkey, and fears over losing control of immigration 
policy” were all large factors contributing to the rejected referendums.259 The BBC notes 
that “many voters feel that Brussels has too much power and that their national politicians 
are not protecting them enough.”260 Dutch voters were also concerned that liberal state 
policies on drugs and gay marriage would be changed at the EU level, and were 
disillusioned by rapid EU enlargement and the single Euro currency.261 For the Dutch 
voters, as well as the French, the growth of the bureaucracy in Brussels represents a 
threat to “liberal values,” national identity, and an increase in faceless economic 
integration.262 In short, questions of sovereignty, rapid European integration, cultural 
preservation and opposition to minorities, and a democratic deficit are all being put 
forward by a European public that has been pushed to the margins in the past.  
 
IV. THE INTERDEPENDENCE MODEL: A DEMOCRATIC WAY FORWARD 
Despite drawbacks, democratic interdependence seems the most effective way 
forward for the European Union, as well as for Great Britain and the Netherlands as 
individual member-states. Several significant authors have influenced my understanding 
of this concept, though one in particular guides my general arguments. Herbert J. Spiro 
introduces a “third way” for interdependence between the relinquishment of national 
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sovereignty and the growth of supranational government.263 Spiro argues that the 
historical example of American democracy has been misinterpreted as purely 
supranational.264 While the United States has supranational qualities, Spiro suggests that 
its legacy of E pluribus Unum “did not proceed from a centre, was not pushed from 
above, and was not obtained by force.”265  
Spiro instead attributes the growth of the American polity to a process of 
interdependence, through which “regions of the country and both horizontal and vertical 
groupings of the people have become increasingly aware of their complex, mutual 
dependence upon one another.”266 The European Union seeks its own democratic legacy 
in the current century. Partly out of necessity, perhaps out of idealism, the EU brings 
together nations that were at war less than a century ago. The method is different, but the 
purpose the same—to create an interdependent one out of many.  
The failure of constitutional referendums, worries about immigration and 
multiculturalism, and member state challenges with minority communities all bring new 
definition to the European democratic project. In the current century, pressed by 
globalization and international forces, the European Union seeks its own democratic 
legacy. These new realities suggest the need for an increase in democratic 
interdependence. Democracies in the current age—particularly the growth of new 
democracies—require an unprecedented level of interdependence. As multicultural 
communities grow, and as the European Union expands to include more diverse 
communities, democratic institutions will rely on the interdependent cooperation of all 
individuals, member states, and Union representatives. As Spiro notes, this 
interdependence may be both conscious and unconscious—directed and mediated or 
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simply “transmitted through the various overlapping networks of the polity, of which 
once perceives oneself as a more or less integral component part.”267 In either case, 
successful multicultural and diverse democracies rely on some form of interdependent 
investment in the fibers of democratic being. At the level of the European Union, several 
scholars have discussed the resolution of the polity’s democratic deficit and offered 
potential solutions to a variety of challenges associated with democratic interdependence. 
Several of these scholars and the significant problems they address will be discussed 
here. 
 
Elizabeth Bomberg and Alexander Stubb: Governance and Legitimacy 
  Before the Constitutional referendums, Bomberg and Stubb identified several 
problems of governance and legitimacy that continue to plague EU officials. Where 
governance is concerned, the EU institutions lend themselves to a system of isolated 
bureaucracy, rather than the democratic representation that is so essential and familiar to 
European citizens.268 While democratic participation at the EU level is arguably more 
important than local participation in state politics, the European Parliament does not 
effectively live up to its responsibility of representing the European public.269 As 
decisions made at the EU level begin to impact citizens more overtly, a strong system of 
democratic representation becomes all the more essential. Though Bomberg and Stubb do 
not provide a solution to the problem of representative governance, understanding the 
complicated history of governance in the EU is important for deciphering the more 
obvious discontent today. 
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Institutional and democratic legitimacy is an equally important dilemma facing 
the EU today. Legitimacy, identified in terms of democracy, performance, and identity, is 
a constant challenge to the EU.270 Democratic legitimacy and governance, as discussed 
above, is limited by a weak Parliament, decreasing citizen participation, and the 
confidential nature of important decision making.271 Where performance is concerned, 
the removal of economic barriers and the creation of a common market have substantially 
integrated European economies, but many individual citizens are negatively impacted by 
this integration.272 Without concerted efforts on the part of European institutions to 
reverse the negative effects of integration on European populations, public opposition is 
not a surprising development. 
The final dilemma of integration identified throughout Bomberg and Stubb’s 
work is the absence of a common European identity. Over the past decade, the EU’s 
geographic membership has expanded drastically, though a common European identity 
has not spread with the borderlines. Member states are integrated by political and 
economic institutions, but the myriad cultures that are subsumed under the umbrella of 
“European” have not reached a similar level of amalgamation. Resistance to Turkish 
accession into the EU and a general wariness of Muslim minorities are two examples of 
the conflicts between cultures. Furthermore, national and state identities are more potent 
than the often ambiguous “European” identity, as was seen during the referendums in 
France and the Netherlands when national identities and interests were used to legitimize 
the rejection of the EU constitution. Until a common thread is found that will link the 
peoples of Europe together, the process of EU integration will always be finite. 
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Sadly, Bomberg and Stubb offer few solutions to the variety of problems they 
identify. Their text is primarily a historical one, though its undercurrents show a 
favoritism for a more integrated European Union. While the rejected referendums do not 
themselves halt progress in the EU, the larger issues identified in part by the authors must 
be resolved if the EU is to avoid major roadblocks in the future. Thus, it is helpful to 
examine other texts and the prescriptions of other authors in order to more critically 
evaluate the challenges and possibilities of European integration. 
 
Prescriptions for Democracy 
 Philippe Schmitter’s book How to Democratize the European Union...And Why 
Bother? offers great discernment into the process of European Union development. He 
extends a historical account of democracy and integration in the European Union by 
examining the need for democratic processes in the areas of citizenship, representation, 
and decision making. Schmitter did not predict the popular rejection of a European 
constitution directly, though he did recognize the dangers of an undemocratic regional 
system of governance. Rather than confining the European Union to pre-existing models, 
Schmitter explores the possibility that the European Union’s emphasis on collaborative 
decision making and negotiation will result in a form of democratic governance that is 
completely new.273 In order to embrace democratic life, however, Schmitter suggests that 
several changes are necessary. 
 The most important of Schmitter’s reforms include increased citizen participation 
through European representative elections and more frequent referendums.274 This would 
allow individual citizens across the EU the opportunity to have a more regular impact on 
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the operations of European supranational institutions. In combination with reforms that 
would protect non-nationals under European auspices as citizens, grant general EU 
citizenship, and introduce social welfare programs, opportunities for participation could 
resolve the sentiments of alienation felt by many European citizens.275 Eventually, 
individuals granted citizenship within the European Union would also be responsible for 
contributing monetarily to the maintenance of democratic institutions, thus maintaining 
the financial stability of the integrated system. Within European Union institutions, 
decision making processes could be made more accountable through the implementation 
of a variety of representation mechanisms that would ensure both proportional and 
functionally specific voting weights within the European Council and Parliament.276 
For Schmitter, the most effective form of democracy is one which recognizes the 
importance of rule by numeric majority, but also the weight of intense minority values.277 
He writes that decisions made by numeric majorities can collide intensely with the 
interests of minority populations, and that it is the role of democratic institutions to 
“displace, if not replace, the majority principle with some other decision rule that 
recognizes disproportionately or protects explicitly the preferences of minority…within 
the same political process.”278 Within the context of territorial expansion, balancing 
majority and minority interests is especially important. In order to avoid fragmentation 
and widespread discontent with EU institutions, the EU will ultimately need to strike an 
even balance between small coalitions and larger minorities. Additionally, the 
frameworks for citizenship and representation will need to be strengthened before 
democracy in the EU can be successful. 
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 EU institutional weaknesses in the area of political integration only impede the 
possibilities of European citizenship and belonging that are so far from becoming 
realities. Indeed, Europe has no universal regional culture, and European “citizens” are 
pulled in seemingly opposite directions in the face of layered “local, regional, national, 
and supranational” identities.279 More importantly, these identities and the welfare of 
individuals have become less important at the European level than the state, economic, 
and business interests that frequently occupy politicians.280 Even at the time of publishing 
in 2000, Schmitter identified increasing “symptoms of morbidity” among the European 
populace, accompanied by unaccountable decision making behind the closed doors of EU 
institutions.281 In order to resolve these problems, reforms that include both the interests 
of the numeric majority and the passions of minority groups will need to be undertaken in 
the long-term by European governments.282 Following the failure of politicians to 
effectively bring European nations under a common constitution, these reforms are all the 
more necessary. 
 
The Option of Federalism: A United States of Europe 
 Even among supporters of European integration, many scholars argue against a 
“United States of Europe.” Schmitter, for example, argues that currently available models 
for governance will not suit the European Union. In contrast, Glyn Morgan argues in The 
Idea of a European Superstate that a federal European state is one of the only ways to 
successfully integrate Europe. Though his arguments are more controversial than other 
authors, he approaches European integration from a perspective that is perhaps more 
accessible to the average European citizen. Essentially, Morgan’s work returns to the 
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very project, process, and product of integration itself and seeks to justify every 
dimension in terms of public interests.283 Furthermore, Morgan’s arguments differ from 
others in favor of integration as a result of his refusal to use economic, welfare, or 
sovereignty as justifications for European integration (or disintegration). Though his 
work has flaws on its own, it does introduce a perspective on public opinion in the EU 
which does not see European integration as an inevitable end. Morgan’s work emerges as 
a valuable addition to the more specific discourse on popular discontent and public 
opinion in the context of an unfinished European integration project. 
 In seeking to affirm European integration by using a democratic standard, Morgan 
suggests that European integration could be justified to both skeptics and adherents in 
terms of individual security.284 He continues this idea by arguing that a federal European 
state is the only model of governance that can successfully ensure individual security, 
whether this is defined primarily as military, economic, food, environmental, or cultural 
security.285 Though his thesis seems to simply co-opt the available model of federalism 
envisioned in existing models like the United States, it does raise the larger issue of 
individual protection that is so vitally important to citizens. In an era where states are 
often unable to protect their constituencies from outside attacks on security and hard 
power cannot function alone, some form of regional governance that begins to balance 
individual interests with government demands is needed. The failure of constitutional 
referendums in France and the Netherlands speaks to the confusion that voters face when 
attempting to navigate the decreasing effectiveness of individual state sovereignty and the 
gaps that are still present in an expanding system of regional governance. 
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 Morgan writes that “People in early modern Europe came, over a period of 
generations, to shift the horizon of their loyalties and attachments from the local to the 
national. There is no reason why, under the right combination of circumstances, this 
could not happen again.”286 For Morgan, these circumstances include justifying the 
project of integration in terms of security, and transferring the powers of foreign, 
security, and defense policy to the European level.287 It is important to note, however, 
that the European institutions need to demonstrate a significant level of effectiveness to 
the European public before full integration can become a reality.288 Furthermore, citizens 
will need to assume and recognize their responsibility for and their impact on the 
institutions that govern them. If they continue to feel completely removed from the 
practices at the European level, no amount of justification will make a constitutional or 
federal European polity succeed. 
 
Multiculturalism and Democracy 
 As European news sources stated following the French and Dutch referendums, 
growing anti-Muslim sentiments and the desire to preserve genuine “European” cultures 
were cited frequently as factors which influenced the negative response to the EU 
constitution. Unfortunately, these factors not only influence popular referendums, but the 
everyday lives of minorities who attempt to integrate into European societies. In her book 
The Islamic Challenge, Jytte Klausen outlines the realities of ethnic intolerance in 
European nations and the political difficulties which face growing European Muslim 
communities. On one hand, the anti-Muslim reactions from Europeans reflect the 
reluctance to admit Turkey into the European Union and the general desire to preserve 
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European morals and values. On the other hand, the “Islamic Challenge” reflects a deeper 
religious and cultural intolerance within European societies. The process of successfully 
integrating difference confronts secular and religiously affiliated states alike, and it is 
testing the very quality of European democracy. 
 Rather than posing an insolvable difficulty, the challenge of cultural and ethnic 
minorities in the European Union is an issue that can be overcome with openness and 
cooperation on the part of both Europeans and minorities. Indeed, Klausen suggests that 
the introduction of Islam into European societies is not deeply divisive or reflective of a 
“clash of civilizations,” but a matter of domestic policy reform.289 The present unrest 
over Muslim populations in Europe arises out of both a realization that Muslims intend to 
remain in European nations, and that European state legislators have failed to create 
policies that will support and protect this growing minority.290 Successful integration will 
require the cooperation and commitment of both European citizens and Muslims, though 
unfair policies at the level of state governments must be dealt with first before Muslims 
can accept an equal role as European citizens. Confronting difference in a democratic and 
cooperative way will be a valuable lesson for state governments as well as European 
institutions.  
 The rejected constitutional referendums represent at one level a failure of state 
governments to justify publicly the integration of minorities into European society as well 
as a failure to legislate policies which allow the protection of Muslim cultural 
specificities. At another level, the inclusion of anti-Muslim sentiments in the reasoning 
behind the negative votes suggests that the effects of the “Islamic challenge” will soon 
reach the level of European Union institutions. If politicians at the state level begin to 
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make policy changes that will integrate Muslim minorities more fairly, pluralistic 
citizenship becomes a real possibility. Otherwise, European institutions will increasingly 
find that opposition to minorities is a recurrent problem. Facing the “Islamic challenge” 
will undoubtedly prove useful as the EU’s borders continue to expand and include more 
diverse identities. 
 
V. THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A GLOBAL MODEL 
 Placing European developments within a context of globalization allows for the 
EU’s broader significance to emerge. Three examples of the EU’s global instructiveness 
are particularly strong.  
First, the European Union should be closely scrutinized for its reinterpretation of 
democratic life. The process of balancing both institutional and cultural idiosyncrasies 
while remaining open to the possibility of democratic participation is a daunting task that 
will be globally instructive even if it does not succeed in this century. Second, the EU 
represents a unique regional mechanism that has the potential to enforce collective 
political, economic, and environmental accountability. Environmental degradation, world 
poverty, human rights, economic development, and long-term political stability among 
other issues must be addressed by a larger community of nations. The European Union is, 
so far, the most successful example of this community of nations, though admittedly on a 
small scale. If ethical leaders and scholars press for the continuation of the integration 
project, however, the EU may emerge as an exceptional model for global cooperation. 
Finally, in returning to the concept of perpetual peace, the European Union represents the 
single largest peaceful polity in the world. Beyond a simple absence of war, the Union is 
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in collaboration and cooperation toward larger ideals. If a similar respect for difference, 
disagreement and compromise can be reproduced around the globe, investment in the 
ambition of globally interdependent nations will not be impossible. 
 The discourse on the European Union is far from finished. At various levels, the 
European Union is combating the same challenges that other nations around the globe are 
facing in differing ways. The EU becomes particularly significant, however, when it is 
placed in a global context. In the coming decades, the literature and scholarly work on the 
EU will benefit greatly from an increased focus on the EU’s potential as a global model 
for cooperative politics and diplomacy. Democracy, citizenship, identity, and the links 
between the political and the individual are all central to the discussion of the European 
Union, as well as to the discussion of life in an era of globalization. The European Union 
as a model for the ways in which democracy and citizenship are changing is an important 
field of study as a result of its dynamism and its potential for redefining democracy. With 
careful attention and progress, Europe’s example could very well lead the globe in a new 
age of political morality, global cooperation, and perpetual peace. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION: DEMOCRATIC INTERDEPENDENCE AS A MODEL FOR 
MULTICULTURALISM 
 
The current thesis has dealt broadly with the difficulty of integrating globalized 
individuals into the traditional state polity through immigration and integration 
legislation. More specifically, I have argued that the increasingly restrictive immigration 
and integration programs of Great Britain and the Netherlands have limited the 
democratic participation and integration of ethnic minority communities in both states. 
The first chapter introduced several significant concepts in understanding the 
globalization of identity and its impact on the state and its legal systems—including the 
notion of statehood, citizenship, globalization, integration, and legal pluralism. Through a 
detailed historical analysis of legislation in Great Britain and the Netherlands, the thesis 
illustrates the increasing resistance to the movement of minority communities, the tone of 
this legislation, and its impact on minority integration. In the final chapter, the thesis 
introduced several models for integrating diverse state bodies and institutions in the 
European Union as a way to explore potential models for creating globalized and 
integrated multicultural states in Europe. 
No single legislative change will transform the successes or failures of 
multiculturalism in Great Britain, the Netherlands, or across the European Union. Each 
polity must define and invest in unique policies and programs for statehood and 
citizenship in an era of globalized individuals, markets, and even security threats. Great 
Britain confronts a different ethnic minority community than the Netherlands does, and 
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the European Union needs unique models to encourage interdependence at a transnational 
level. In practical terms at the state level, this means that both state institutions and 
multicultural citizens have a responsibility to commit themselves to such projects. Both 
individuals and state legislators should be held equally accountable for encouraging a 
tolerant and democratic state with globalized and multicultural threads. A variety of 
models exist for promoting multicultural and pluralistic states, though I am particularly 
influenced by the innovative interdependence model that emerges from the growth of the 
European Union itself. This model is particularly attractive for three reasons.  
First, it is grounded in the European experience of managing difference. Despite 
the often divisive cultural, economic, and political differences that existed in Europe 
following the Second World War, interdependence emerged as a way to form a greater 
economic stability. Second, the theories of interdependence can be molded to fit 
transnational, state, or local necessity. Finally, and most importantly, it holds a 
community and a polity equally responsible for the development of a peaceful and fairly 
managed multicultural democracy. The next brief section will explore the three essential 
elements in a unique model of democratic interdependence.  
 
Building Democratic Interdependence: A Three-Part Model for Multiculturalism 
 Grounded in European concepts of economic interdependence, and equally 
influenced by the literature that has emerged on pluralism and assimilation, I suggest a 
new theoretical model is needed as a guide for both immigration and integration 
legislation, and for the growth of informed hybrid citizens. For multiculturalism to 
succeed as a political project in Great Britain, the Netherlands, and perhaps other 
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countries, I suggest that three key components must exist. In each of the three concept 
areas, equal participation is needed from both minority citizens and the state. 
Interdependence, by any definition, is reliant on such participation, and it is of intense 
necessity in the case of a growing multicultural state.  
 The first component of a successfully hybridized and multicultural state is a 
common infrastructure of democratic institutions that are accessible to transitioning 
minority and ethnic groups. New citizens (and even non-citizens) must become familiar 
with their rights, obligations, and opportunities to participate in the democratic life of 
countries like the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. In the beginning of its days as a 
democratic melting pot, the United States was idealized and dreamed of by immigrants 
all over the world. Not only economic opportunity, but democratic opportunity, fueled 
these dreams. Minority citizens and new arrivals must take part in the initiative to learn 
about the potential of the democratic institutions that could serve them, and make a 
consistent effort to become involved in democratic processes for change. Equally, state 
governments must encourage legislation that educates and informs its newest and most 
diverse citizens. The concept of “democracy” and its institutions may be envisioned 
differently by the state and current minority groups, but a conversation of compromise 
and accommodation on both sides will be an unavoidable part of building an 
interdependent and intercultural state. Throughout any process of negotiation, there must 
also be a sense of investment in common democratic institutions that will be functional 
and accessible to the entirety of the polity.  
 Building on the component of democratic institutions, the second component of a 
multicultural state is a lasting environment of legitimacy and accountability, particularly 
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where democratic exchanges are concerned. Minority citizens who become actively 
engaged in democratic processes must be able to count on the effectiveness of the 
institutions that they place their faith in. They need more than bland assurances that 
minority voices are being heard. Similarly, government officials and policy makers must 
receive substantial evidence that minority populations can be held accountable. If 
promises are made for change on either side of the spectrum, these promises must be kept 
legitimate and then followed by accompanying enforcement actions. Both minority 
citizens and the state should be held responsible for maintaining the democratic 
institutions that protect the polity as a whole. When suitable broad agreements are 
reached between minority groups and the state, these agreements should be recognized by 
law. 
 The third and final component that is essential to a multicultural state is 
legislative and judicial authenticity. Put simply, this component gives enforcement power 
to the state’s intercultural negotiations. In the United States, this supreme authenticity is 
granted to minorities, the majority, and the state by the Constitution and the Courts that 
preside over it. For states that have little or no protection for minority rights, this third 
component weighs more heavily on their own initial efforts to ensure that legislation is 
fair, impartial, and enforceable. Nonetheless, it is the responsibility of minority citizens to 
follow the laws prescribed by the state and to respect a judiciary with the power to 
maintain a fair democracy. If legislative changes are necessary, both the state and 
minority groups must recognize the lengthy democratic process that must occur before 
legislation can be made reality.  
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Suggestions for Further Research 
 The three components I have identified are only the beginning of a theoretical 
model for encouraging a successful multicultural state. As a result, they are dangerously 
broad, and would significantly benefit from the inclusion of more practical and 
programmatic elements. I have attempted to include some suggestions in each of the case 
studies for legislative change, but resolving uncertainty around immigration legislation 
alone will not provide the impetus needed for a stable and interdependent multiethnic 
state. Two improvements on my own research and pathways for future research exist. 
 First, keeping the theoretical challenge of interdependence in mind, a more 
practical research project might propose wider legislative changes or policy proposals 
that go beyond the sphere of immigration and integration. The concept of 
interdependence could be applied to a variety of “state-building” programs in European 
nations to encourage multicultural identities and legislation, but only with additional and 
focused quantitative research. Additional research on conflict resolution theories or 
integration theories might also prove fruitful in negotiating multicultural European states. 
Secondly, a narrower focus on the specific ethnic groups and their successes and 
difficulties with integration would have provided an entirely different lens for the project. 
Though my background is not anthropological, a qualitative study of a particular ethnic 
group in one case study country would be a beneficial way to test the theories of 
interdependence that I have developed. More importantly, a qualitative analysis might 
introduce new theories that are common among minority communities themselves. 
Growing interdependence and multicultural theories from the roots of ethnic communities 
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would no doubt produce different results than my own “top-down” approach of looking 
at European Union institutions.  
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